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ABSTRACT
This report presents engineering methods, models, and results to enable an evaluation 
for locating a hydrogen production facility near a nuclear power plant.  Standard 
probabilistic safety assessment methodologies were used to answer the risk-related 
questions for a combined nuclear and chemical facility: what can happen? how likely is it 
to happen? and what are the consequences of it happening?  As part of answering these 
questions, a model was developed suitable to determining the distances for separating 
hydrogen process and nuclear plant structures.  The objective of the model-development 
and analysis is to answer key safety questions relating to the placement of one or more 
hydrogen production plants in the vicinity of a high-temperature nuclear reactor.  From a 
thermal-hydraulic standpoint, proximity of the two facilities is beneficial.  Safety and 
regulatory implications, however, force the separation to be increased, perhaps 
substantially. The likelihood of obtaining a permit to construct and build such as facility in 
the United States without answering these safety questions is questionable.  The 
quantitative analysis performed for this report offers a scoping mechanism to determine 
key parameters relating to the development of a nuclear-based hydrogen production 
facility.  The calculations indicate that when the facilities are less than 100 m apart, the 
core damage frequency is large enough (greater than 1E-6/yr) to become problematic in a 
risk-informed environment.  However, a variety of design modifications (blast-deflection 
barriers, for example) could significantly reduce risk and should be further explored as 
design of the hydrogen production facility evolves. 
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1Separation Requirements for a Hydrogen Production 
Plant and High-Temperature Nuclear Reactor
1. ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES 
1.1 Background 
Producing and storing hydrogen with a nuclear power plant poses unique engineering problems 
associated with operational safety.  As has been done with the current generation of nuclear power plants, 
in this report we formally evaluate safety using the methods of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) 
(Bedford and Cooke 2001).  However, unlike conventional analysis, our approach to assessing hydrogen 
safety in connection with the new generation of nuclear reactors focuses on a multidimensional array of 
hazards (not simply such a measure as core damage), hazards of interest to both engineers and decision-
makers with a stake in the safe and efficient operation of the proposed facility. 
In general application, PSA techniques answers three questions: 
1. What can happen?
2. How likely is it to happen?  
3. What are the consequences of it happening? 
This report answers these three questions with regard to evaluating the risks associated with high-
temperature hydrogen production.  Initially (Section 1), the focus is on the development of a model 
suitable to assist in determining distances for separating hydrogen process structures and the nuclear plant 
structures.  Then (Section 2), we overview the methods and objectives used to evaluate the decision to 
locate a hydrogen production facility near a nuclear power plant.  Finally (Section 3), we present the 
results of the detailed analysis. 
Our primary objective of the model-development and analysis is to answer key safety questions 
relating to placement of one or more hydrogen production plants in the vicinity of a high-temperature 
nuclear reactor.  As illustrated 
in Figure 1, we determine the 
risk implications as a function 
of location for the reactor and 
hydrogen facilities.  From a 
thermal-hydraulic perspective, 
we would like the two facilities 
to be quite close.  From a safety 
and regulatory perspective, 
implications force the distance 
to be increased, perhaps 
substantially.  Without 
answering the safety questions 
posed in this report, the 
likelihood for obtaining a permit 
to construct and build such as 
facility in the United States 
would be questionable.  
Figure 1.  The distance to be evaluated from a safety perspective 
separating the high-temperature nuclear reactor and the hydrogen 
production facility. 
2Our secondary objective of model development and analysis is to provide decision makers tools and 
insights into potential engineering designs that may mitigate hazards inherent in coupling nuclear and 
hydrogen production facilities.  In addition to estimating risk as the distance separating the facilities is 
modified, these safety-based tools allow selection of a variety of facility types, e.g., different chemical 
processes, safety barriers, and inventory levels.  
Though currently in substantial use worldwide, hydrogen is not a benign material, as demonstrated 
by the occurrence of events relating to the production, transportation, and storage of hydrogen (for 
example, the Stockholm explosion in 1983 (Venetsano et al. 2003) the outcome of which is shown in 
Figure 2).  Generating hydrogen will require understanding its deflagration and detonation potential and 
the risks associated with using hazardous chemicals during production.  Understanding hydrogen risks is 
critical at such regulatory agencies as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), since hydrogen is 
used at current generation nuclear power plant facilities.  Such plant use of hydrogen has been 
investigated though such programs as the NRC’s Generic Safety Issue 106, Piping and Use of Highly 
Combustible Gasses in Vital Areas (INEL 1994).  The safety analysis work proposed in this report will 
build upon and extend that body of knowledge specific to the high-temperature production of hydrogen in 
next-generation nuclear power plants. 
Figure 2.  Hydrogen cylinder explosion in Stockholm in 1983 from a total of 13.5 kg of hydrogen 
(Venetsano et al. 2003). 
In addition to hydrogen deflagration and detonation risks, the safety of the associated chemical 
process must also be addressed.  The analysis documented in this report determines the potential for upset 
conditions to occur to the nuclear facility during hydrogen generation.  For example, the risk from acid or 
3toxic gas clouds from a release must be evaluated.  Both hydrogen and chemical-based evaluations and 
models will be used to provide decision makers insights into the inherent safety of the processing 
facilities.  Thus, these analyses will be used to build safety and reliability into the design of high-
temperature production of hydrogen (as opposed to back-fitting safety into current-generation nuclear 
power plants, which has proved to be costly). 
The high-temperature hydrogen facility is really two plants in one, a nuclear power plant and a 
chemical processing plant.  Balancing the needs of these two plants will require safety, cost, reliability, 
chemistry, and thermal-hydraulics models.  The focus of the safety analysis work will be on reliability 
and safety, both of which will ultimately impact other attributes, such as cost and thermal-hydraulics.  
Consequently, this work (and the associated models) may be used to iterate on design characteristics 
specific to the facility in question. 
The primary focus of the safety analysis work in this report is on determinating applicable separation 
distances to give the nuclear facility a sufficient buffer zone from the hazards associated with the 
hydrogen production plant, such as hydrogen gas detonations and toxic chemicals.  Consequently, the 
distance evaluation is expressed as a distribution reflecting the probabilistic aspect of the analysis.  Using 
this distance distribution, decision makers will be able to select a suitable level of protection to prevent 
unlikely events from impacting the nuclear facility.  The analysis provides state-of-the-practice models, 
quantification, and recommendations specific to several issues, including: 
x Separation distances from nuclear/hydrogen deflagration and detonation hazards 
x Pressure wave calculations 
x Blast loading calculations and failure probability quantifications 
x Passive mitigation alternatives. 
Separation distances from other process hazards, such as acid or other gas clouds dispersion, brings safety 
and reliability into the design picture for high-temperature production of hydrogen.  Probabilistic methods 
(i.e., PSA) provides insights into the synergy between nuclear and chemical processes, answering safety-
related questions specific to separations of the two processes. 
1.2 Other Related Regulation and Past Analysis 
Combustible gasses such as hydrogen, propane, acetylene, and methane are used in various 
capacities during normal operation of nuclear power plants.  Hydrogen is one of the most prevalent 
combustible gasses and is safely being used at most nuclear power generation facilities.  For example, 
hydrogen is used as a coolant for the main electrical generator in both pressurized water reactors (PWRs) 
and boiling water reactors (BWRs).  Also, in PWRs, it is supplied to the chemical volume and control 
system to manage the dissolved oxygen concentration in the reactor coolant system.  In BWRs, water 
chemistry control systems are used for the same purpose.  And, for all light-water nuclear plants, 
hydrogen is present in the waste gas systems as a product of water dissociation during power operation. 
Past hydrogen safety analyses focused on evaluating current generation plants with respect to: 
x Location of potential leaks or upsets
x Rate of occurrence of deflagration and detonations 
x Consequence of the rate, which is a function of inventory, venting, combustibility of gas, etc. 
These analyses have found relatively low risk at current plants, due to such features as the distant 
separation of critical components from hazards (e.g., the hydrogen storage facility may be hundreds of 
4meters away from critical buildings), low inventory of gasses, abundance of backup safety systems, and 
passive safety systems such as flow-limiting valves.  Since the high-temperature production of hydrogen 
plant will, by design, be relatively close to the nuclear facility and may generate and store a large quantity 
of hydrogen (and potentially other hazardous chemicals), it is critical that safety be evaluated and 
controlled early in the design process for this facility. 
Generic Safety Issue (GSI) 106, Piping and the Use of Highly Combustible Gasses in Vital Areas, 
was identified in NUREG-0705 by the NRC in 1981 as a potential issue warranting attention (Simion et 
al. 1993).  This GSI addressed the issue of potential damage resulting from the use of combustible gasses 
such as hydrogen, propane, acetylene, and methane in operating nuclear power plants.  While the 
distribution and storage systems for these gasses are not, in many cases, safety related, it was apparent 
that leakage or ruptures from failures of these systems in areas containing or adjacent to safety-related 
equipment have the potential to impact overall plant risk.  Originally, the GSI-106 technical work focused 
only on hydrogen piping inside safety-related areas.  The scope was later expanded to include such 
concerns as hydrogen storage facilities. 
Current NRC regulations and guidelines consider the use and storage of highly flammable gasses 
(such as hydrogen) and liquids within and near the plant.  Specifically, 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, 
regulations explicitly require plants to establish administrative controls that "prohibit the storage of 
combustibles in safety-related areas or establish designated storage areas with appropriate fire protection."  
Standard Review Plan (SRP), Section 9.5.1, iterates these control measures and recommends design and 
safety features of hydrogen systems.  More recent “risk-informed” types of NRC regulations are stated in 
10 CFR 50.44 and associated guidance documents such as Regulation Guide (RG) 1.174. 
General guidance on gaseous hydrogen storage may be found in national fire protection standards 
such as in Gaseous Hydrogen Systems at Consumer Sites, NFPA 50A.  For standards concerning 
liquefied hydrogen storage, “Liquefied Hydrogen Systems at Consumer Sites,” NFPA 50B, is applicable.  
However, due to the costs associated with operation, we do not expect that liquefied storage of hydrogen 
will be used in any HTGR-to-hydrogen production facilities. 
Other pertinent rules include the OSHA Regulations (Standards, 29 CFR), which for hydrogen is in 
Part 1910, Section 103 (Hydrogen, 1910.103).  Note that OSHA considers hydrogen a hazardous material 
and governs if accordingly.  Any industrial facility that stores and distributes hydrogen must conform to 
OSHA Part 1910.103(b)(1)(iii).  This standard provides guidance on such construction details as joints 
in piping and tubing (e.g., they may be made by welding or brazing or by use of flanged, threaded, socket, 
or compression fittings).  Further, crude guidance is provided on separation distances in 
1910.103(b)(2)(ii).  This section states that the location of a hydrogen system must be a minimum of 50 ft 
from intakes of ventilation or air-conditioning equipment and air compressors.  From a risk perspective, 
however, hydrogen storage facilities may need to be much farther away from risk-sensitive buildings and 
components.
Storage containers for hydrogen or other combustible gasses must comply with the following: 
x ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII - Unfired Pressure Vessels 
x API Standard 620, Recommended Rules for Design and Construction of Large, Welded, Low-
Pressure Storage Tanks 
x OSHA Appendix R Section 1910.6. 
Any facility using hydrogen gas must comply with the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 
Codes and Standards, NFPA 50A and NFPA 220. NFPA 50A is the standard for gaseous hydrogen 
systems at consumer sites; NFPA 220 is the standard on types of building construction.   These standards 
5dictate the methods required for construction and use of hydrogen.  However, these standards provide 
only minimal requirements—agencies such as the NRC may require more strict requirements, as needed. 
Current NRC standards for combustible gas activities fall under the technical requirements of 
10 CFR Part 50, specifically 10 CFR 50.44 (Standards for Combustible Gas Control System in Light 
Water-Cooled Power Reactors).  In conjunction with these deterministic standards, a risk-informed 
framework has also been recently adopted and used in NRC activities.  The NRC staff has developed a 
framework that describes the overall approach, process, and guidelines they will use when reviewing risk-
informed alternatives to the deterministic requirements stated in 10 CFR Part 50.  Initially, this 
framework was part of SECY-00-0086.  However, the risk-informed applications have expanded to 
numerous other parts of the NRC regulations (e.g., CFR 50.46, RG 1.174, CFR 50.109).  Guiding 
principles to this modern approach to regulation at the NRC include: 
1. Use a risk-informed defense-in-depth approach to accomplish the goal of protecting public health 
and safety. 
2. Set guidelines that limit 
a. The frequency of accident initiating events 
b. The probability of core damage 
c. The release magnitude following core damage events 
d. The effects to the public during accidents 
3. Consider both design-basis and core-melt accidents 
4. Treat applicable uncertainties 
5. Use quantitative guidelines based on the NRC Safety Goals and the subsidiary objectives of 1×10-4
per reactor year for core damage frequency and 1×10-5/ry for large early-release frequency. 
1.3 Analysis Safety Criteria 
Current NRC risk-informed applications use the criteria in RG 1.174.  An overview of this process is 
depicted in Figure 3.  Following this process, the general principles of risk-informed regulation followed 
by the NRC include: 
x The application meets current regulations unless it explicitly relates to a requested exemption or rule 
change
x The application is consistent with the general defense-in-depth philosophy 
x The application maintains sufficient safety margins 
x The application maintains small risk and is consistent with the intent of the NRC’s Safety Goal 
Policy Statement. 
Of importance for next-generation nuclear facilities is the second bullet above, specifically that 
relating to the application of defense-in-depth.  Even though advanced facilities may be demonstrated to 
be safer than the current generation of plants, the NRC may still require some level of defense-in-depth to 
account for the uncertainty inherent in the safety of plant operations.
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Figure 3.  Typical path for regulating nuclear power plants by the NRC, including risk-informed 
applications.
When issues are evaluated using RG 1.174 at the NRC, all safety impacts of the issue are to be 
evaluated in an integrated manner in order to improve operational and engineering decisions.  
Quantifications of risk is a fundamental part of this process.  Toward that goal, the NRC has indicated that 
metrics such as core damage frequency and large early release frequency may be used as bases for PSA.  
However, they have specifically requested that appropriate consideration of uncertainty be given in the 
analyses and that an interpretation of findings be performed as part of any analysis. 
Decision criteria have been identified as part of RG 1.174 in order to allow or disallow changes to 
existing nuclear power plants.  These criteria are shown in Figure 4.  While the figure has only been 
applied for the current generation of nuclear power plants, we would expect that risk from next-generation 
plants would (a) be held to a stricter limit and (b) would be evaluated in similarly.  What can be taken 
from the information in Figure 4 is that a core damage frequency (for the proposed hydrogen facility) that 
is above the 1E-6/yr threshold would be scrutinized.  In a follow-on to this preliminary report, we will 
evaluate a variety of risks in terms of potential core damage—these risk estimates will be compared to the 
decision criteria spelled out in RG 1.174 and shown in Figure 4. 
Other applicable regulations that potentially play a role in the design, construction, and operation of 
the hydrogen production facility are RG 1.91, Evaluations of Explosions Postulated to Occur on 
Transportation Routes Near Nuclear Power Plants (NRC 1978) and RG 1.78, Evaluating the Habitability 
of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release (NRC 2001a). 
7Figure 4.  Decision criteria for risk-informed applications at the NRC (from RG 1.174). 
Regulatory Guide 1.91, “Evaluations of Explosions Postulated to Occur on Transportation Routes 
Near Nuclear Power Plants,” was released in 1978.  This guide suggests that overpressures from 
explosions should not exceed 7 kPa on plant structures.  Based on experimental TNT data, a safe distance 
can then be defined by the relationship R > 18 W1/3, where R is the distance (in meters) from an exploding 
charge of W pounds of TNT (or equivalent gas such as hydrogen).  However, we did not use approximate 
methods such as TNT equivalencies in our analysis.  Instead, we used the results from a computer code 
that employs physics-based principles to model the shock waves and combustion processes inside a 
reacting hydrogen mass. 
Regulatory Guide 1.78, Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a 
Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release, was updated and released in 2001.  This guide discusses issues 
relating to the protection of nuclear power plant control rooms.  It suggests that the control room should 
be adequately protected from chemical dispersions outside the plant.  While primarily focusing on 
chemical sources such as storage tanks, railroad cars, barges, etc., the utilization of hazardous chemicals 
on site as part of hydrogen production falls under the umbrella of this regulatory guide.  The guide further 
specifies criteria for control room habitability: 
“Any hazardous chemical stored onsite within 0.3 miles [482 m] of the control room in a 
quantity greater than 100 pounds [45 kg] should be considered for control room 
habitability evaluation. Hazardous chemicals should not be stored within the close 
proximity (generally within 330 feet [91 m] or less) of a control room or its fresh air inlets, 
including ventilation system intakes and locations of possible infiltration such as 
penetrations. Small quantities for laboratory use, 20 pounds [9 kg] or less, are exempt. The 
maximum allowable inventory in a single container stored at specified distances beyond 
330 feet [91 m] from the control room or its fresh air inlet varies according to the distance 
and the control room type” (NRC 2001a). 
Our dispersion analysis (Appendix A) provides a detailed evaluation of the hazardous limits of a 
variety of chemicals that could be released under accident scenarios.  We did not, however, perform 
8control room habitability studies relating to the potential intake of chemicals into the control room, 
filtering mechanisms, and air flows through postulated control room structures.  In order to perform this 
type of detailed analysis, the design of both the nuclear and chemical facilities would need to be better 
specified, for example the location and type of the control room would need to be known (e.g., 
above/below ground, single control room for multiple reactors, enclosure/filtering type), and the 
quantities and composition of hazardous chemicals would need to be listed. 
92. PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the facilities discussed in this report (both the nuclear and chemical portions) are still in the 
preliminary stages, a variety of design assumptions were necessary for the evaluation.  Supplementing 
these assumptions, sensitivity calculations were performed (e.g., varying the separation distance between 
the nuclear and chemical plants; varying the locations of key systems, such as the control room).  While it 
is expected that extremely large quantities of hydrogen will not be stored permanently on site, an 
appreciable amount of high-pressure gaseous hydrogen is expected to be near the nuclear facility.  
Further, different chemical processes will entail different types and quantities of potentially hazardous 
material.  Thus, calculations were performed on the chemical process to be used, including: 
x A sulfur-iodine process with sulfuric acid, I2, and HI 
x A hybrid sulfur process with sulfuric acid but no iodine compounds 
x A high-temperature electrolysis process without hazardous chemical feedstocks. 
Our PSA work focused on a few key areas to determine adequate separation between the nuclear and 
chemical facilities.  Figure 5 outlines the areas identified for consideration in this report.  In general, two 
cases, overpressure events (e.g., detonations and deflagrations) and dispersion events describe the 
potential accident scenarios.  Note that we did not perform a PSA on the HTGR itself; that is, events 
internal to the HTGR are excluded from this analysis.  Nor did we analyze risk implications due to the 
secondary heat exchanger.  For example, the choice of the secondary working fluid, molten salt or helium, 
was excluded because these will not cause external impacts to the HTGR, with the exception of 
potentially causing a reactor transient, which falls into the category of HTGR internal events.  However, 
interactions between components in the chemical facility that may increase risk to the HTGR (e.g., 
causing a hydrogen explosion) are included in the scope of the analysis. 
Overpressure Events Dispersion Events
Detonations Deflagrations
Operator-caused Events
Random Hardware Failure Events
Seismic Events
Impact to Nuclear Power Plant from
the Hydrogen Generation Facility
Figure 5.  Master logic diagram for potential disruption scenarios. 
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As mentioned, we identified and analyzed dispersion cases for a set of representative hazardous 
chemicals.  For these dispersion models, we selected the ALOHA code developed by the EPA and 
NOAA.  The analysis for dispersion events is presented in Appendix A.  The frequency of these potential 
releases is evaluated in this section. To evaluate the risk from hydrogen detonation and deflagration 
events, we selected the SAPHIRE risk analysis code developed at INEEL (Russell et al. 1999).  The 
SAPHIRE code was supplemented with associated modeling such as hydrogen blast wave calculations. 
To model the detonation events, we constructed scenarios specific to each potential accident 
category.  These models use the event tree and fault tree capabilities provided by the SAPHIRE software.  
Since the facility being analyzed has not yet been fully designed, we assumed likely configurations, 
layouts, and operational practices to perform the analysis.   
2.2 Modeling the Accident Scenarios 
The scenario modeling was performed using the probabilistic risk assessment code SAPHIRE (The 
Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations) which refers to a set of 
microcomputer programs developed to create and analyze PSAs.  
2.2.1 Event Tree Modeling 
The facility scenario modeling involves the representation of three initiating events: 
1. Random hydrogen explosions 
2. Human-induced hydrogen upsets 
3. Seismic-induced acid or hydrogen rupture. 
From these initiating events, plant response to these initiating events are represented using event 
trees with various end states of the facility response to the initiator. 
2.2.1.1 Random Hydrogen Explosion Event Tree 
The random hydrogen explosion event tree represents the nuclear power plant response to a random 
hydrogen explosion event.  Figure 6 shows the random hydrogen explosion event tree.   
The initiating event for this event tree is called DETONATION.  This event represents a random 
explosion in the hydrogen production plant.  The two top events for the event tree are STRUCTURAL 
and CORE_DAMAGE.  The STRUCTURAL top event represents a single basic event system that 
models the probability of the nuclear power plant sustaining damage given there is a hydrogen explosion. 
This event is further developed in Section 2.3.1.  The CORE_DAMAGE top event represents a single 
basic event that models core damage to the nuclear power plant given that there was structural damage to 
the nuclear plant.  This event is further developed in Section 2.3.3.  The end state outcomes for the 
random hydrogen explosion event tree are DISPERSION, CD, or DAMAGE.  The DISPERSION end 
state represent those scenarios that result in a dispersion of chemicals.  The core damage end state or CD 
represents those scenarios that result in damage to the nuclear fuel in the core.  The DAMAGE end state 
represents those scenarios that result in nuclear plant structure being impacted but do not result in damage 
to the core. 
11
Figure 6.  Random hydrogen explosion event tree. 
The event tree structure is used to represent the interaction among the top events when exposed to 
the initiating event.  If there is a hydrogen explosion, then the structural damage of the power plant is 
questioned.  If there is no structural damage with STRUCTURAL being successful (the up branch), there 
may still be a possibility of core damage given that an upset condition did occur.  If  CORE_DAMAGE is 
successful (the up branch), there could still be present an hazardous chemical leak from the chemical 
plant, which gives Sequence 1, having an end state of DISPERSION.  If CORE_DAMAGE has occurred 
given an upset condition, then this scenario leads to Sequence 2, having an end state of CD.   
If there is a hydrogen explosion that results in structural damage with STRUCTURAL being failed 
(the down branch), then again the core damage is questioned.  If there is no core damage, with 
CORE_DAMAGE being successful (the up branch), then this results in Sequence 3, having an end state 
of DAMAGE.  With this end state, there is still damage to nuclear plant and a chemical leak, but there is 
no core damage to the nuclear fuel.  If there is structural damage and there is core damage with 
CORE_DAMAGE being failed (the down branch), then this leads Sequence 4, having an end state of CD. 
2.2.1.2  Human-Caused Hydrogen Explosion Event Tree 
The human-caused hydrogen explosion event tree represents the nuclear power plant response from a 
human instigated hydrogen explosion event.  Figure 7 shows the human-caused hydrogen explosion event 
tree.
CORE DAMAGE
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No Damage
to NPP
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No Damage to Reactor 
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3 Damage
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H2_EXPLOSION - Accident scenarios resulting from random hydrogen explosions 2005/03/29 Page 1
Given an Explosion
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Figure 7.  Human-caused-upsets event tree. 
The initiating event for this event tree is HUMAN ERROR.  This event represents a human error-
caused explosion in the hydrogen storage plant.  The three top events for the event tree are EXPLOSION, 
STRUCTURAL, and CORE_DAMAGE.  The EXPLOSION top event is a single basic event system that 
represents the probability of a hydrogen explosion given a hydrogen leak.  The STRUCTURAL top event 
represents a single basic event system that models the probability of the nuclear power plant sustaining 
damage given there is a hydrogen explosion.  The CORE_DAMAGE top event represents a single basic 
event that models core damage to the nuclear power plant given that there was structural damage to the 
nuclear plant.  The end state outcomes for the human-caused hydrogen explosion event tree are 
DISPERSION, CD, or DAMAGE.  The DISPERSION end state represents those scenarios that result in a 
dispersion of chemicals.  The core damage end state or CD represents those scenarios that result in 
damage to the nuclear fuel in the core.  The DAMAGE end state represents those scenarios that result in 
the nuclear plant structure being impacted but do not result in damage to the reactor core. 
The event tree structure is used to represent the interaction among the top events when exposed to 
the initiating event.  If a human error-induced hydrogen leak event occurs, then the possibility of an 
explosion occurring from the leak is questioned.  If there in no explosion with the EXPLOSION top event 
being successful (the up branch), then this results in Sequence 1, having an end state of OK where no 
substantial negative consequences occur.  If there is a hydrogen explosion, then the structural damage of 
the power plant is questioned.  If there is no structural damage with STRUCTURAL being successful, 
there may still be a possibility of core damage given that an upset condition did occur.  If  
CORE_DAMAGE is successful (the up branch), there could still be present an acid leak from the 
CORE DAMAGE
No Core Damage
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No Damage
to NPP Structures
EXPLOSION 
No Explosion
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HUMAN  ERRROR
Frequency of
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H2_HUMAN -  Accident Scenarios Resulting from Human-Caused Upsets 2005/03/17 Page 2 
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chemical plant, which gives Sequence 2, having an end state of DISPERSION.  If CORE_DAMAGE has 
occurred given an upset condition, then this scenario leads to Sequence 3, having an end state of CD.
If there is a hydrogen explosion that results in structural damage with STRUCTURAL being failed 
(the down branch), then again the core damage is questioned.  If there is no core damage, with 
CORE_DAMAGE being successful (the up branch), then this gives Sequence 4, having an end state of 
DAMAGE.  With this end state, there is still damage to nuclear plant and an acid leak, but there is no core 
damage to the nuclear fuel.  If there is structural damage and there is core damage with 
CORE_DAMAGE being failed, then this leads to Sequence 5, having an end state of CD. 
2.2.1.3 Seismic-Induced Hydrogen Explosion Event Trees 
The seismic-induced hydrogen explosion event trees represent the nuclear power plant response from 
a seismic-induced hydrogen explosion event.  The seismic-induced hydrogen explosion is represented by 
three event trees, with each event tree signifying a seismic initiating event at a specific g-level ground 
acceleration (i.e., earthquake magnitude).  For each g-level earthquake initiator, the top event EQ-
OCCUR is questioned if an earthquake at that particular g-level occurred.  If the earthquake did not occur, 
resulting end state 1 is OK with no plant damage.  If the earthquake at the specified g-level did occur and 
EQ-OCCUR is failed, then this results in a transfer to the event tree SEIS1.
Figure 8 shows the seismic g-level 1 hydrogen explosion event tree.  For this event tree, the g-level 
ground acceleration (i.e. earthquake magnitude) is 0.1.  At this g-level, the ground acceleration is low and 
not many components are expected to fail due to seismic ground motion.   
SEISMIC G-LEVEL 1
Earthquake
Occurance at
Specified G-level
EQ-OCCURGLEVEL1 NUMBER END-STATE NAMES
1
T2=> 3
OK
SEIS1
GLEVEL - Seismic transfer event tree for a G-level 0.2 earthquake 2005/03/24 Page 4
Figure 8.  G-Level 1 seismic event tree. 
Figure 9 shows the seismic g-level 2 hydrogen explosion event tree.  For this event tree, the g-level 
ground acceleration (i.e., earthquake magnitude) is 0.3.  At this g-level, ground acceleration is significant 
and has the likelihood of several components failing due to seismic ground motion increases. 
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Figure 9.  G-Level 2 seismic event tree. 
Figure 10 shows the seismic g-level 3 hydrogen explosion event tree.  For this event tree, the g-level 
ground acceleration (i.e., earthquake magnitude) is 0.6.  At this g-level, ground acceleration is high, and 
the likelihood of several components failing due to seismic ground motion is the greatest. 
Figure 10.  G-Level 3 seismic event tree. 
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GLEVEL3 -  Seismic transfer event tree for a G-level 0.6 earthquake 2005/03/24
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Once the g-level of the earthquake has been determined, each seismic g-level event tree transfers to 
the main seismic-induced hydrogen explosion event tree, SEIS1.  The SEIS1 event tree represents the 
nuclear power plant response from a seismic-induced hydrogen explosion event.  Figure 11 shows the 
main seismic-induced hydrogen explosion event tree.  
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         2 OK
         3 Dispersion
         4 CD
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         6 CD
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CD_Damage 
Page 3
Hydrogen Leak 
Reactor Given
Figure 11.  Seismic-induced hydrogen explosion event tree. 
The initiating event for this event tree is determined by the G-level event trees and is either 
GLEVEL1, GLEVEL2, or GLEVEL3.  These initiating events represent the probability of occurrence of 
a specified ground acceleration earthquake (g-level).  If a specified g-level earthquake occurs, the 
resulting end state is a transfer to the SEIS1 event tree.  The first top event in this tree is INIT1, which is 
an event that represents the occurrence of specific g-level earthquake.  The remaining top events for the 
event tree are H2SO4, H2SYS, EXPLOSION, STRUCTURAL, and CORE_DAMAGE.  The H2SO4 top 
event represents the success or failure of the sulfuric acid plant system.  Success of this system is the non-
occurrence of a hazardous chemical leak.  The H2SYS top event represents the success or failure of the 
hydrogen production system.  Success of this system is nonoccurrence of the discharge of hydrogen due 
to a rupture.  The EXPLOSION top event is a single basic event system that represents the probability of 
a hydrogen explosion given a hydrogen leak.  The STRUCTURAL top event represents a single basic 
event system that models the probability of the nuclear power plant sustaining damage given there is a 
hydrogen explosion.  The CORE_DAMAGE top event represents a single basic event that models core 
damage to the nuclear power plant given that there was structural damage to the nuclear plant. 
SEIS1 -  Seismic Event Tree 2005/03/28
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The end state outcomes for the seismic-induced hydrogen explosion event tree (SEIS1) are 
DISPERSION, CD, or DAMAGE.  The DISPERSION end state represents those scenarios that resulted 
in a dispersion of chemicals.  The core damage end state or CD represents those scenarios that resulted in 
damage to the nuclear fuel in the core.  The DAMAGE end state represents those scenarios that resulted 
in the nuclear plant structure being impacted but did not result in damage to the core. 
The event tree structure is used to represent the interaction among the top events when exposed to 
the seismic initiating event.  If specific g-level earthquake occurs, then the condition of sulfuric acid plant 
is questioned.  If the earthquake caused an acid leak with H2SO4 being failed, then this scenario results in 
Sequence 7, having an end state of DISPERSION.  If the sulfuric acid plant remains intact with no acid 
leak, where H2SO4 is successful, then the condition of the hydrogen storage system is questioned next.  If 
the hydrogen storage system remains intact, where H2SYS is successful, then the result is Sequence 1, 
having an end state of OK, where no substantial negative consequences occur.  If the hydrogen storage 
system is damaged by the seismic event with H2SYS being failed, this results in the top event 
EXPLOSION (the possibility of an explosion occurring from a hydrogen leak) being questioned.   
If there in no explosion with EXPLOSION being successful, then this scenario results in Sequence 2, 
having an end state of OK, where no substantial negative consequences occur.  If there is a hydrogen 
explosion, then the structural damage of the power plant is questioned.  If there is no structural damage 
with STRUCTURAL being successful, there may still be a possibility of core damage given that an upset 
condition did occur.  If  CORE_DAMAGE is successful, there could still be present an acid leak from the 
chemical plant, which gives Sequence 3, having an end state of DISPERSION.  If CORE_DAMAGE has 
occurred given an upset condition, then this scenario leads to Sequence 4, having an end state CD. 
If there is a hydrogen explosion that results in structural damage with STRUCTURAL being failed, 
then again the core damage is questioned.  If there is no core damage, with CORE_DAMAGE being 
successful, then this gives Sequence 5, having an end state of DAMAGE.  With this end state, there is still 
damage to nuclear plant and an acid leak, but there is no core damage to the nuclear fuel.  If there is 
Structural damage and there is core damage with CORE_DAMAGE being failed, then this leads 
Sequence 6, having an end state of CD. 
2.2.2 System Fault Tree Modeling 
This section presents the fault tree models required to support the top events in the event trees.  In 
many cases, the system top events are represented by a single basic event.  The sulfuric acid system and 
hydrogen storage system are systems with multiple components, and these systems require representation 
with more complicated fault trees.  
The following assumptions and guidelines were used in developing the system fault tree models: 
x Only the failure of major components that could rupture or leak (i.e., pumps, valves, cooling units) 
was considered 
x The component failure mode for all components in the hydrogen storage system and sulfuric acid 
system is failure due to rupture or leak 
x Possible human recovery actions from the leak or rupture were not modeled 
x Rupture or leak due to common-cause failures were not considered. 
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2.2.2.1 Hydrogen Storage System Fault Tree Model 
The hydrogen storage system is a highly pressurized system designed to pressurize hydrogen gas 
using compressors and store the gas into pressure vessels.  Accumulators are used to take the pressurized 
hydrogen from pressure vessels and disperse it for use or transportation.  Figure 12 illustrates a 
simplified, standard hydrogen storage system.  This system is what is used to develop the hydrogen 
storage system fault tree model. 
Figure 12.  Hydrogen storage system piping diagram. 
The hydrogen system is represented by the H2SYS-S1, H2SYS-S2, and H2SYS-S3 fault trees.
These fault trees contain the random rupture failure events for the major components and the seismic-
induced failures for the seismic susceptible components.  Figure 13 illustrates fault tree H2SYS-S1.  This 
fault tree contains seismic events for a 0.1 g-level earthquake and is used in the GLEVEL1 seismic event 
tree. Figure 14 illustrates fault tree H2SYS-S2.  This fault tree contains seismic events for a 0.3 g-level 
earthquake and is used in the GLEVEL2 seismic event tree.  Figure 15 illustrates fault tree H2SYS-S3.
This fault tree contains seismic events for a 0.6 g-level earthquake.  For all three fault trees, the shaded 
components in the figures represent the seismic-susceptible events.  
18
Figure 13. Fault tree H2SYS-S1. 
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Figure 14. Fault tree H2SYS-S2.
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Figure 15. Fault tree H2SYS-S3.
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2.2.2.2  Sulfuric Acid System Fault Tree Model
A sulfuric acid system is designed to take raw elemental sulfur and create sulfuric acid for storage in 
a large storage tank.  Figure 16 illustrates a simplified, generic sulfuric acid plant.  The major components 
modeled were the air blower, combustion chamber, acid pump, and final product storage tank.  We used 
this system depiction as a surrogate for the chemical facility that will employ hazardous chemicals.   
Figure 16.  Sulfuric acid system piping diagram. 
The sulfuric acid system is represented by the H2SO4-S1, H2SO4-S2, and H2SO4-S3 fault trees.  
These fault trees contain the random rupture failure events for the major components and the seismic-
induced failures for the seismic susceptible components.  Figure 17 illustrates fault tree H2SO4-S1.  This 
fault tree contains seismic events for a 0.1 g-level earthquake and is used in the GLEVEL1 seismic event 
tree. Figure 18 illustrates fault tree H2SO4-S2.  This fault tree contains seismic events for a 0.3 g-level 
earthquake and is used in the GLEVEL2 seismic event tree.  Figure 19 illustrates fault tree H2SO4-S3.
This fault tree contains seismic events for a 0.6 g-level earthquake.  For all three fault trees, the shaded 
components in the figures represent the seismic susceptible events.      
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Figure 17.  Fault tree H2SO4-S1.
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Figure 18.  Fault tree H2SO4-S2.
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Figure 19.  Fault tree H2SO4-S3. 
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2.3 Quantifying the Risk Model 
2.3.1 Blast Analysis 
To determine structural effects from detonation events, we used the blast analysis performed as part 
of Generic Safety Issue 106, Piping and the Use of highly Combustible Gases in Vital Areas.  As part of 
this research, the NRC had the INL staff determine blast effects on plant structures such as reinforced 
concrete walls from gaseous hydrogen detonations (INEL 1994).  The results of this work are documented 
in report EGG-SSRE-9747, Improved Estimates of Separation Distances to Prevent Unacceptable 
Damage to Nuclear Power Plant Structures from Hydrogen Detonation for Gaseous Hydrogen Storage.
The blast analysis work performed by INL evaluated separation distances from hydrogen storage facilities 
to the current generation of light water nuclear reactor safety structures.  The blast evaluation did not use 
equivalencing hydrogen to a TNT detonation; instead, it used a computer code that employed physics-
based principles to model shock wave and the combustion process inside a reacting hydrogen mass.  
While the shock wave is attenuated with distance, the analysis also considered the incident wave pressure, 
velocity, impulse time history, and the associated reflected wave.  The shock wave impulse information 
was used to determine the effect on the target surfaces and looked at a variety of wall conditions, 
including variations in wall thickness, static pressure capacity, and tensile steel factor.  The calculations 
assumed hemispherical expansion, which should be suitable for our analysis since we are not modeling 
hydrogen detonations that occur significantly above ground level.  For further information on the general 
properties of hydrogen, see Cadwallader and Herring (1999). 
One of the main analysis results from the EGG-SSRE-9747 report was a determination of minimal 
separation distances from the point of the hydrogen detonation as a function of the detonating volume of 
hydrogen.  This calculation was performed for different wall sizes and compositions, ranging from 12 to 
24-in. wall thicknesses and static pressure capacities from 1.5 to 4.5 psi.  We have taken these 
calculations and used the variation in structural makeup to provide a mechanism to reflect the modeling 
uncertainty we have on the ultimate design of major structural systems such as the HTGR containment 
building. The result of this modeling is shown in Figure 20.  To iterate, the calculations used to construct 
the curves shown in this figure do not use TNT equivalence approximations. 
The blast versus separation distance curves give us one portion of the risk model, that of imposing a 
structural load on the reactor building as a function of separation distance.  For situations where we are in 
the lower-right regions of Figure 20, the reactor structure is assumed to have failed (we have exceeded the 
wall capacity, or the impulse from the detonation is greater than the wall can bear).  Consequently, we 
need to model both the detonating volume and the separation distance in the risk model in order to 
determine if we are below the detonation distance curve.  However, one complication here is that there is 
model uncertainty in the detonation distance curve, as shown in Figure 20.  In this figure, we see that the 
uncertainty increases as the separation distance or detonating volume increases.  That is, the region 
between the upper and lower bound curves increases, indicating that our state of knowledge becomes less 
precise as either the separation distance increases (with a corresponding lower structural wall failure 
probability) or as the detonating volume of hydrogen increases (with a corresponding higher structural 
wall failure probability). 
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Figure 20.  Separation distance as a function of the detonating volume of gaseous hydrogen, including the 
uncertainty in wall composition and thickness. 
In order to model the detonation distance curve and its impact on the failure potential of the reactor 
structures, we need a calculation to find the probability that we are in the structural failure region (lower 
right) of Figure 20.  First, we will use a standard “load-capacity” type of calculation.  For this calculation, 
we define the following relationships: 
L = the load, which is a function of VD and the separation distance 
C = the capacity 
 = the curves shown in Figure 20 at a particular value of VD
where   
VD = the detonating volume 
 = ƒ V. 
where
ƒ = yield (the fraction of the hydrogen that participates in the detonation 
V = total volume of hydrogen in storage. 
Typical values of ƒ range from 0.05 to 0.25 (INEL 1994).  For our analysis, we modeled the yield by way 
of a uniform distribution from 0.05 to 0.25. 
ƒ ĺ Uniform(0.05, 0.25) 
whereĺ  implies the assignment of an uncertainty distribution to the ƒ parameter. 
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The capacity term represents the ability of the nuclear structure to withstand the imposed loading 
conditions from the detonating hydrogen.  However, this capacity is uncertain, where the uncertainty 
depends on a specific plant configuration (e.g., distance, wall thickness, amount of hydrogen).  In order to 
illustrate the “capacity” information, we have discretized the detonation distance curves into three cases: 
C1 ĺ Normal(3.5 kg, 0.9 kg) 
C2 ĺ Normal(8.0 kg, 2 kg) 
C3 ĺ Normal(14.5 kg, 3.9 kg). 
where the three cases correspond to a separation distance of 20, 40, and 60 m, respectively. 
The parameterization of these distributions defined above for the capacity model represents the mean 
and standard deviation.  For example, the second term, C2, is the capacity defined at a separation distance 
of 40 m, where the mean is 8.0 kg of hydrogen, and the standard deviation is 2 kg.  This response to 
hydrogen detonation event distributions is illustrated in Figure 21. 
To determine whether the nuclear plant structures will be damaged given a hydrogen explosion, we 
need to calculate the probability that the load (L) is greater than the capacity (C), or 
P(L > C) = structure failure probability . 
To perform this calculation, we used Monte Carlo simulation using 1,000,000 iterations, where at 
each iteration we randomly sample from the capacity and load functions and determine whether the load 
is greater than the capacity.  The ratio of the number of times the load exceeds the structural capacity 
provides the structural failure probability.  This calculation is repeated for the separation distances shown 
in Table 1, where for each distance we also list the lower bound, mean, upper bound, and standard 
deviation on the capacity curves shown in Figure 21.   
Figure 21.  The structural capacity curves for the four cases used in the risk analysis model. 
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Table 1.  Variation in structural response as a function of separation distance for hydrogen  
detonation events. 
Separation
Distance (m) 
Lower Bound 
Volume (kg H2)
Mean Volume 
(kg H2)
Upper Bound 
Volume (kg H2)
Standard Deviation 
Volume (kg H2)
 0  0 0 0 0.0 
 10  3 1.5 1 0.4 
 20  6 3.5 2.5 0.9 
 30  9 6 4 1.3 
 40  13 8 5.5 1.9 
 50  17 11 7.5 2.4 
 60  25 14.5 9.5 3.9 
 70  25 17 11.5 3.4 
 80  25 20 13.5 2.9 
 90  25 23.5 15.5 2.4 
 100  25 25 17 2.0 
 110  25 25 19.5 1.4 
 120  25 25 22 0.8 
 130  25  25 25 0.0 
The load term represents the pressure impulse condition imposed upon the nuclear-related building 
structures.  Like the capacity term, the loading is also uncertain and is a function of distance, yield, and 
total volume of hydrogen available.  To represent the variety of these conditions, we have assumed that 
the largest amount of hydrogen stored at the chemical facility and available to participate in a single 
detonation event is 100 kg.  In the worst-case scenario, the detonation will have the highest yield fraction 
(ƒ = 0.25) and will result in the largest modeled detonating volume of hydrogen (VD = 25 kg).  While the 
INEL analysis on hydrogen combustion did not evaluate larger detonation events, it did note that “greater 
detonating volumes … may error on the unconservative side” (INEL 1994).  However, we do recommend 
that as hydrogen is produced, it is piped offsite for compression and storage, thereby limiting the overall 
on-site storage in a single location to less than 100 kg of hydrogen. 
Since the parameter ƒ is uncertain and has been assigned as a uniform distribution from a yield of 
0.05 to 0.25, this implies that the detonating volume for an event will also be uncertain.  Further, we do 
not know the ultimate on-site storage capacity (assumed to be less than 100 kg) of hydrogen as it is 
produced, which indicates that the total volume parameter is also uncertain.  The stored volume of 
hydrogen may range from very small amounts during initial starting conditions to full storage capacity 
(100 kg).  Consequently, we have chosen to model this parameter with an uncertainty distribution also, 
specifically a uniform distribution ranging from a lower bound of 0 kg to an upper bound of 100 kg.  
Thus, the relationship for the detonating volume under accident conditions is: 
VD  =  ƒ V ĺ  Uniform(0.05, 0.25) × Uniform(0 kg, 100 kg) . 
If the load, L, is greater than the capacity, C, then the reactor structure is assumed to be failed.  The 
Monte Carlo simulation using 1,000,000 iterations provides the number of times, out of the total number 
of iterations, that the structure will fail.  The result of this calculation is shown in  
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Figure 22 as a function of the separation distance.  In Section 3, we used this probability-of-failure 
curve to evaluate the sensitivity of the risk results when the hydrogen facility is moved nearer or farther 
from the nuclear plant. 
We should note that beyond separation distances greater than 140 meters, the probability of 
experiencing structural damage becomes quite low (less than 1E-3).  This observation is due to two 
reasons: the attenuation of the blast shock wave rapidly decreases with distance, and we limited the 
maximum on-site storage of hydrogen to 100 kg.  If the total amount of hydrogen available to participate 
in a detonation exceeded the 100 kg value, then the structural failure probability would increase 
somewhat.  However, as the amount of hydrogen increases, the yield fraction has a tendency to decrease, 
thereby neutralizing some of the impact caused by the larger amount of hydrogen. 
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Separation Distance (m)
P(
fa
ilu
re
)
Figure 22.  Probability of nuclear plant structural failure from hydrogen detonation events as a function of 
the separation distance between the plant and the hydrogen generation facility. 
2.3.2 Likelihood of Hydrogen Events 
In our risk models described in Section 2.2, we have three parameters relating to hydrogen 
explosions.  The first is the frequency of hydrogen explosions due to “random” component failures in the 
hydrogen production and storage facility.  The second is the probability of having an explosion when a 
leak of hydrogen is present.  The third is the frequency of hydrogen leaks caused by human error. 
To model the frequency or probability of hydrogen-related events, we reviewed past operational 
events at nuclear power plants.  A search was conducted to identify hydrogen events at U.S. nuclear 
power plants that resulted in fires, leaks, explosions, or potentially explosive concentrations.  The primary 
source of information found was the analysis performed for GSI-106 (Simion et al. 1993).  Based on 
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information obtained from this study, it appears that several hydrogen events occurred in the United 
States.  The review of these hydrogen events determined that 83 were a hydrogen leak, explosion, fire, or 
potentially dangerous concentration in the plant (see Figure 23).  Of the 83 hydrogen events, 33 resulted 
in either a fire and/or explosion and are applicable to events that may occur at the hydrogen production 
facility.  These 33 events are shown in Table 2. 
Figure 23.  Hydrogen events at nuclear power plants in the United States over a 21-year period (Simion 
et al. 1993). 
Table 2.  Summary of the hydrogen events by BWR and PWR plant location, excluding technical 
specification concentration limits (Simion et al. 1993). 
Event Location 
(time in reactor years) 
Explosion
Events
Fire
Events
Uncombusted
Leak
Total
Events
Turbine building 
(1424 BWR/PWR) 
 2  7  7  16 
Volume control tank 
(917 PWR) 
 0  0  11  11 
Rad-waste gas system 
(917 PWR) 
 1  0  1  2 
Hydrogen storage system 
(1424 BWR/PWR) 
 2  1  0  3 
Batteries
(1424 BWR/PWRs) 
 1  0  0  1 
Total hydrogen events  6  8  19  33 
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The events identified in Table 2 may be used to determine applicable initiating event frequencies.  
Once these frequencies are identified, the accident sequences resulting from the upset condition are 
modeled using event trees and fault trees in the SAPHIRE software (see Section 2.2).  The event trees 
provide the unifying structure for the hydrogen risk PSA.  An event tree is a graphical description of 
accident sequences, where the first branch on the event tree is the initiating event.  It then proceeds from 
left to right, calling out and showing how the systems (top events) are reacting to the initiating event (on 
the left).  The sequence analysis proceeds through this path, with the success or failure of a top event at 
each branch of the tree.
First, to evaluate the frequency of “random” hydrogen explosions, we used the events that led to 
explosions (a total of six events) in the nuclear plant experience.  We used a Jeffreys noninformative prior 
distribution, which was updated with the event data using standard Bayesian practices (Atwood et al. 
2003).  Thus, for each applicable plant area, we end up with a gamma distribution with parameters 
Į = x + 0.5 and ȕ = t , where x represents the number of explosion events and t represents the data 
collection time (in reactor years).  The result of this analysis is the curves shown in Figure 24. 
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Figure 24.  Hydrogen detonation event rate of occurrence for five plant areas. 
Since each of the curves shown in Figure 24 provides information potentially relevant to the rate of 
seeing hydrogen detonation events in the chemical facility, we use this information as part of the overall 
uncertainty on this rate parameter.  In other words, the rate of hydrogen detonation events, ȜHD, is 
provided by factoring each of the curves above.  If we believed one area were more representative of the 
operation of the chemical facility with respect to the processing and storage of hydrogen, we could weight 
that area’s curve higher.  However, we weighted the area information equally, which then provided the 
uncertainty information for the total rate, as shown in Figure 25.  This distribution was used in the 
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SAPHIRE risk analysis model and was entered as a probabilistic histogram.  Note that the mean of this 
detonation rate is 8E-4/yr, which indicates that the mean frequency of “random” hydrogen explosions is 
about 8E-4/yr.  This initiating event rate is comparable to the frequency of experiencing a complete loss 
of service water or having a small-break loss-of-coolant accident in the current fleet of nuclear power 
reactors.
The second parameter of interest for hydrogen events was the probability of having an explosion if a 
leak of hydrogen were present.  For this probability, denoted as P(explosion | leak), we again used the 
data in Table 2.  However, we now focus solely on the conditional probability that given we see an event, 
what is the likelihood that the event results in a hydrogen explosion.  For this analysis, we grouped the 
explosion and leak event data into a single category, which gave us a total of 25 events.  Of these 25 
events, a total of six resulted in explosions.  Thus, for our data analysis, we have 25 events and 6 
“failures” (those which go to an explosion).  As for the frequency of hydrogen explosions, we used a 
Jeffreys noninformative prior distribution, which was updated with the event data using standard 
Bayesian practices (Atwood et al. 2003).  In this case, then, we end up with a beta distribution with 
parameters Į = x + 0.5 and ȕ = 0.5 + n - x , where x represents the number of explosion events (6) and n 
represents the total number of events (25).  The result of this analysis is the cumulative probability curve 
shown in Figure 26.  This probability distribution was used in the SAPHIRE risk analysis model.  The 
mean of this distribution is a probability of 0.25, or about 25% of the hydrogen leaks seen in the 
operational record resulted in an explosion. 
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Figure 25.  The uncertainty on the total rate of hydrogen detonation events applicable to the  
chemical facility.
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Figure 26.  The conditional probability of seeing an explosion given that there is a leak of hydrogen. 
The third parameter of interest for hydrogen events was the frequency of hydrogen leaks caused by 
human errors.  To determination this event, we used information in the GSI-106 report (Simion et al. 
1993).  In this report, the hydrogen events for the BWR off-gas system had identified several events that 
had causal mechanisms relating to human activities on that system.  For example, one event was caused 
by changes in maintenance procedures.  A second event was due to “personnel error.”  These operation 
events spanned a collective time of 507 years of plant operation.  Within this time, a total of five human-
related events were identified.  As for the frequency of hydrogen explosions, we used a Jeffreys 
noninformative prior distribution, which was updated with the event data using standard Bayesian 
practices (Atwood et al. 2003).  In this case, we end up with a gamma distribution with parameters 
Į = x + 0.5 and ȕ = 0.5 + t , where x represents the number of human-related hydrogen events (5) and t 
represents the total time (507 years).  The result of this analysis is the cumulative probability curve shown 
in Figure 27.  This distribution was used in the SAPHIRE risk analysis model.  The mean of this 
distribution is a rate of 0.01 per year, which is comparable to the rate of seeing a loss-of-offsite power in 
the current fleet of nuclear power reactors.  We should note that this rate is only the frequency of seeing 
hydrogen leaks—the probability of having an explosion given a leak is also factored into the accident 
sequence via the event tree model described in Section 2.2. 
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Figure 27.  The rate of human-caused hydrogen events (per year). 
2.3.3 Probability of Causing Core Damage 
For some of the accident scenarios described in Section 2.2, we require a probability that the 
scenario (to that point) will eventually lead to a core damage event.  In our model, we represent two 
distinct conditions, first where we require probability of core damage given that a hydrogen detonation 
physically damages the nuclear plant structures.  For the analysis in this report, we did not have detailed 
models relating to consequential core damage following structural damage of the nuclear plant building.  
Second, for those situations that do not damage the nuclear plant structures, we still have an upset 
condition (e.g., potential loss-of-offsite power, loss of the secondary heat-exchanger, plant transient) that 
requires knowledge of the probability of core damage.  To evaluate these two conditions, we ideally 
would have access to a full-power PSA for the HTGR.  However, such a study does not exist for the 
current plant design, which resulted in using a PSA performed in the mid-1980s by GA Technologies. 
The PSA performed by GA Technologies (Everline 1984) evaluated a 558-MW(e) modularized 
prismatic HTGR.  This design is similar to the point design (MacDonald et al. 2003) currently being 
evaluated for the hydrogen-producing VHTGR (very-high-temperature gas reactor).  In the GA 
Technologies PSA, the reactor building contains a reactor module embedded in the earth and consists of a 
concrete enclosure encasing the reactor internals.  The reactor building also functions as a filtration 
system to capture particulates and halogens. However, this system is not able to withstand accident 
loading conditions.  For our analysis, we assume that a loading of 7 kPa or more will result in functional 
failure of portions of the aboveground portion of the reactor building.  Note that 7 kPa is the peak 
pressure identified in RG 1.91 for wind loading of nuclear-related structures, systems, and components 
35
(SSC).a  Of further concern for scenarios that compromise the rector building is the potential for air 
ingress if the reactor’s primary coolant boundary is damaged. 
One scenario of concern is a detonation or deflagration event that impacts the aboveground reactor 
building structure but does not cause damage to the reactor’s primary coolant boundary nor result in a 
reactivity insertion event.  This type of event will most likely result in (at best) a plant transient.  
However, the 1984 PSA indicates, for these types of events, that “… releases with an intact primary 
coolant boundary and a reactor building failure have no identifiable safety risk significance.” 
The frequency of core damage is our primary metric for evaluation in this report, not the release 
frequency or associated risk.  Thus, from the 1984 PSA, we have extracted potentially applicable risk 
scenarios and their quantification insights.  This information is shown in Table 3.  While the 1984 PSA 
did quantify uncertainty on release consequences, the uncertainty for the scenarios identified in Table 3 
were not provided—however, we expect the sequence level uncertainty to be typical of that found in more 
recent PSAs, or about a factor of 10 from the specified frequency to both the 5th and 95th percentiles.
Further, we assume that the values supplied represent means; we have entered the values as means in the 
SAPHIRE risk model. 
We used the information in Table 3 to represent the conditional probability of core damage from a 
variety of accident scenarios.  For example, in the seismic event tree for a 0.2 g earthquake (see Section 
2.2), Sequence 2 represented the earthquake, no failure of the hydrogen production facility, but core 
damage due to the earthquake itself.  In this sequence, the probability of core damage given the 
earthquake is found in Table 3, third column, and has a value of 6E-9 per earthquake event. 
Table 3.  Accident scenario information for the GA Technologies 1984 HTGR PSA. 
Type of Accident 
Scenario
Frequency 
(per year) 
Conditional
Probability of 
Core Damage Comments 
Loss of offsite 
power and 
subsequent trip 
1E-9 1E-7 Active cooling in this scenario was dependent on function 
of on-site diesel generators.  The passive cooling does not 
require diesel generators. 
Loss of the Heat 
Transport System 
5E-8 2E-8 Active cooling in this scenario was dependent on 
available ac-power sources. 
Anticipated 
transient without 
scram 
6E-7 2E-7 The probability of failing to scram the reactor was 
assumed to be 1E-5 per demand, which is similar to that 
found for the current fleet of light water reactors in the 
U.S. [US NRC, 2001b] 
Earthquake (0.2 g) 2E-11 6E-9 Earthquake frequencies were taken from the Zion and 
Seabrook PRAs.  It is assumed that seismic events also 
result in a loss of offsite power. 
Earthquake (0.4 g) 1E-11 2E-8 The reactor Heat Transport System is assumed to be 
failed for g levels at 0.4 g and above. 
Earthquake (>0.4g) 2E-11 2E-7 The reactor Heat Transport System is assumed to be 
failed for g levels at 0.4 g and above. 
For the case where a hydrogen detonation results in structural damage to the nuclear facility, we 
needed to determine the probability that cooling systems remaining in the plant will be operational.  For 
this scenario, we used the 1984 PSA, specifically for the dominant seismic sequences that question the 
availability of cooling following an earthquake.  While the response of equipment during an earthquake is 
                                                     
a Note that a design basis tornado with wind speeds of about 195 mph could have a pressure loading of about 10 kPa. 
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different than that of building structural damage, this scenario was the closest match to the hydrogen 
detonation event in our PSA.  From the 1984 PSA, the relevant cooling system failure probabilities were: 
P(core damage | structural damage) = P(heat transport fails) * P(shutdown cooling fails) 
 =  1.0 * 2E-2 
 =  2E-2  . 
2.3.4 Seismic Events 
The frequency of earthquake events is from Lawrence Livermore report NUREG-1488 (NRC 1993), 
which is an update of the earlier report NUREG/CR-5250 (Bernreuter et al. 1988).  Since we decomposed 
the earthquake sizes into three groups, we had to evaluate the frequency for each group to determine the 
group’s average rate.  The results of this analysis are shown in Table 4.  The last column in this table 
presents the initiating event frequencies used in the SAPHIRE risk model for the seismic event trees. 
Table 4.  Earthquake frequency information for the three seismic event trees. 
Ground
Acceleration (g) 
Exceedance
Frequency (1/y) 
Seismic Bin 
for Model 
Seismic Bin 
Acceleration (g) 
(geometric
average)
Seismic Bin 
Frequency 
(1/rcry) 
0.050 9.59E-04 
0.075 5.43E-04 
0.150 1.81E-04 
0.200 1.26E-04 
0.250 7.10E-05 
0.300 4.94E-05 
1
(0.05 -0.2g) 
0.100 8.33E-04 
0.400 2.69E-05 
0.500 1.62E-05 
2
(0.2 - 0.4g) 
0.283 9.91E-05 
0.650 8.60E-06 
0.800 5.05E-06 
1.000 2.76E-06 
3
(0.4 - 1.0g) 
0.632 2.41E-05 
Once the frequency of the particular size of earthquake is known, we must then consider the failure 
probability for components in the hydrogen production facility conditional upon the size of the 
earthquake.  The “size” of an earthquake is measured by its peak ground acceleration, or g.  The fragility 
of a component is the probability that the component fails, which is a function of g (the larger the 
earthquake, the more likely the component is to fail).  For a particular component, we let Af denote the 
failure acceleration, or the ground acceleration that is just sufficient to cause a component to fail: 
f RA  =    .D H
where Į is the median failure acceleration capacity of the component and İR is a lognormal variable 
representing the random variation on the component failure.  The İR term is a function of two parameters, 
BetaR and BetaU, which have been tabulated for a variety of components.  For our analysis, we used 
component fragility information from NUREG/CR-6544 (Budnitz et al. 1998).  The functional form of 
the fragility equation to determine the failure probability as a function of the g level is given by: 
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where Ɏ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.  We used this equation to determine the 
probability that a component will fail given that is has been subjected to an earthquake of size g.  The 
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results of the analysis are shown in Table 5, where the component data have been gathered from 
NUREG/CR-6544 (Budnitz et al. 1998).  These failure probabilities are used in the SAPHIRE risk model 
for the respective fault tree logic models relating to the seismic event trees. 
Table 5.  Probability of failure for a variety of component types due to earthquakes of three different 
acceleration (g) levels. 
Component Description 
Median 
Capacity
(g) BetaR BetaU
Component Seismic Fragility  
First g group 
Second g group 
Third g group 
1.45E-12 
1.14E-06 Accumulator 2.5 0.3 0.35 
1.43E-03 
6.06E-11 
6.59E-06 Air Handling Unit 2.5 0.3 0.4
2.98E-03 
8.51E-15 
2.76E-07 Buried welded steel piping 2 0.25 0.3 
1.59E-03 
6.67E-08 
1.79E-04 Cable Trays 2.5 0.35 0.5
1.21E-02 
8.44E-11 
1.81E-05 Heat Exchanger 1.9 0.3 0.35 
8.47E-03 
6.67E-08 
1.79E-04 HVAC duct 2.5 0.35 0.5
1.21E-02 
9.87E-08 
1.61E-03 Large storage tanks 1.1 0.3 0.35 
1.15E-01 
4.05E-11 
1.11E-05 Motor pumps 2 0.3 0.35 
6.23E-03 
1.26E-09 
1.04E-05 MOVs 3.8 0.35 0.5 
1.65E-03 
1.26E-09 
1.04E-05 Piping 3.8 0.35 0.5
1.65E-03 
6.06E-11 
6.59E-06 Pressurizer 2.5 0.3 0.4 
2.98E-03 
1.26E-09 
1.04E-05 Safety or check valves 3.8 0.35 0.5
1.65E-03 
4.69E-14 
1.04E-07 Switchgear 3.1 0.3 0.35 
2.81E-04 
8.44E-11 
1.81E-05 Transformer 1.9 0.3 0.35 
8.47E-03 
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2.3.5  Parameters from the SAPHIRE Risk Model 
Within a PSA, the fault trees and event trees provide the logic modeling structure.  However, within 
this structure, the basic events (i.e., those events at the lowest level modeled in the fault trees) provide the 
probabilistic information needed to determine results such as core damage frequency.  The discussion in 
Section 2.2 overviews the models used for our analysis.  In Appendix B, we list all of the basic events 
used in the SAPHIRE risk model.  In the appendix, we provide information on the basic event, including 
the event name, probability (or frequency, per year, if it is an initiating event), uncertainty distribution 
type and parameters, description, 95th percentile value of the uncertainty distribution, and supplementary 
notes, as illustrated below. 
EXPL-H2LEAK 2.50E-01 Beta(6.5, 19.5) 
    EXPLOSION DUE TO HYDROGEN LEAK 95th = 3.98E-1 
Note:
2.3.6 Nominal Risk Results 
The SAPHIRE risk model developed using the parameters and structure described in this section 
provide for three distinct end states or accident scenarios.  First, we have modeled situations that lead to 
damage of the reactor core—labeled “core damage.”  Second, hydrogen detonation events may damage 
the reactor structures but do not lead to core damage—these scenarios were labeled “damage.”  The 
outcome of these scenarios will be plant upsets such as losses of offsite power or transients and will 
include dispersal of some chemical inventory, as described in Appendix A.  Third, are events that lead to 
damage within the hydrogen production facility but do not damage the reactor core or structural 
facilities—these are labeled “dispersion.”  These events are expected to lead to a dispersion scenario, as 
modeled in Appendix A.  Both the second and third types of scenarios lead to dispersion events—events 
that may impact the habitability of the reactor control room and associated facilities.  Further, events in 
the second category are worse in the sense that in addition to the dispersion of chemicals, nuclear plant 
structures may be compromised (for example, the control room if located near the hydrogen production 
facility).  However, due to the lack of detailed design information relating to the location, type, and 
structure of the control room, we did not model control room degradation in conjunction with these types 
of dispersion scenarios.  Thus, we combined scenarios of the second and third categories into the general 
case of dispersion events (note that the accident frequency of the second category was about 10% of the 
third category). 
For the nominal assessment, we assumed that the reactor was situated 60 m from the hydrogen 
production facility.  This assumption implies that the primary on-site hydrogen storage subsystem is 
located 60 m from the nearest nuclear plant structure.  Further, for the nominal case, we assume that no 
mitigating systems (e.g., blast wall) are used.  For this nominal distance, we used the SAPHIRE risk 
model to quantify the mean (or expected) frequency for both core damage and dispersion events.  The 
results of this calculation are shown in Table 6. 
Table 6.  Mean risk results for the hydrogen plant SAPHIRE risk model. 
Case
Core Damage Frequency 
(per year) 
Dispersion Frequency 
(per year) 
Nominal 7E-6 3E-3 
The first result in Table 6, the core damage frequency, can be compared directly with the risk metrics 
and guidance described earlier, for example that in used in RG 1.174.  The dispersion result, however, 
deserves additional discussion on the interpretation.  The nominal analysis yielded a frequency of 
dispersion events from the hydrogen facility as 3E-3 per year.  This frequency should not be confused 
with a core damage frequency, since dispersion events do not lead directly to core damage. However, it is 
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possible that impacts to a nuclear power plant control room may lead to some events that result in loss of 
reactor control and subsequent core damage.  Further, while we were able to quantify the frequency of 
such releases, the probability that a control room is compromised is a function of a variety of site-specific 
features, such as prevailing winds, time of year, local geography, location of the leak, and specific 
chemical types.  Note that RG 1.174 gives no quantitative guidance on what would be an acceptable 
initiating event frequency for accident scenarios. 
Regulatory Guide 1.78, which discusses the evaluation of control room habitability, is deterministic 
in the sense that it requires detailed analysis when hazardous chemical are located within 482 m of the 
control room (NRC 2001a).  Consequently, with the separation distances we evaluate in this report, it is 
expected that much of the hydrogen production facility would fall under the umbrella of this Regulatory 
Guide.  If RG 1.78 were risk-informed, then analysis related to the frequency of chemical release and the 
probability of impacting the control room would be applicable.  However, this risk-informed aspect is not 
in that guide.  Instead, we evaluated the consequence of a variety of chemical releases (see Appendix A), 
present that information with the calculated frequency of a dispersion, and note that the frequency of core 
damage should be significantly lower than the dispersion frequency, since the dispersion event must 
travel to the control room (or intake structures), bypass filtration systems, incapacitate the nuclear plant 
staff, and ultimately lead to loss of control, which then goes to a core damage event.  Nonetheless, due to 
the fact that a complex chemical processing facility is going to reside next to a nuclear power plant, we 
examine a sensitivity case in Section 3 wherein the control portion of the plant is moved a distance from 
the nuclear facility. 
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3. DESIGN MODIFICATION ANALYSIS 
While the nominal risk analysis results indicate that the frequency of core damage (7E-6/yr) is low at 
a separation distance of 60 m, these results are above the regulatory threshold (1E-6/yr) normally 
considered by the NRC in such guidance as RG 1.174 (for example, see Figure 4).  Current risk-informed 
practices allow for plant modification when the risk increase is “very small,” where the criterion of this 
term is: 
“When the calculated increase in CDF is very small, which is taken as being less than 10-6
per reactor year, the change will be considered regardless of whether there is a calculation 
of the total CDF” (NRC 2002). 
Since the risk results are on the cusp of a regulatory threshold, we undertook several sensitivity 
analyses, looking at a variety of methods to help mitigate—or in some cases remove—risk drivers.  As 
part of our sensitivity analysis relating to potential design modifications, we evaluated six different 
situations:
1. Varying the separation distance to the maximum distance evaluated in this report 
2. Constructing an earthen barrier between the nuclear and chemical facilities 
3. Constructing the nuclear facility primarily underground 
4. Constructing blast panels near the chemical facility to dampen overpressure events 
5. Constructing the chemical facility primarily underground 
6. Moving the nuclear plant control room offsite. 
We describe each of these analysis cases and discuss the results of the analysis for risk and 
engineering insights.  Note, however, that while we did perform sensitivity analyses to look at risk 
sensitivities, the overall analysis should be considered to be a best-estimate analysis.  Since the available 
detailed design information is limited, the analysis models used in this report tend to go toward the 
conservative side when considering the uncertainty in the best-estimate calculations.  Also, for these 
sensitivity calculations, we focused solely on risk insights and did not consider impacts relating to the 
cost of construction or the operation of the plant. 
3.1 Case 1:  Vary the Distance 
For this case, we allow the distance between the HTGR and the hydrogen production facility to vary.  
The risk calculations are repeated as the separation distance is either increased or decreased from the 
initial distance of 60 m.  We 
illustrate this case in Figure 28.
For our analysis, we moved the 
chemical facility as close as 20 
m from the reactor and, in 
increments of 20 m, increased 
the separation distance to a 
total of 140 m.  At each 
distance, the SAPHIRE risk 
model was reevaluated and the 
mean risk value determined by 
running an uncertainty 
analysis. 
Figure 28.  Case 1: varying the separation distance between the 
nuclear and hydrogen production facilities. 
41
In Figure 29, we plot the results of the separation distance analysis, where we show the core damage 
frequency from the three initiating events we considered:  seismic events, human errors, and random 
explosions.  In this figure, we provided a demarcation to indicate the point of “very small” risk (at 
1E-6/yr), where we see distances for separation above about 110 m, the risk level is above the 
demarcation.  However, this observation should be tempered by the fact that these calculations do not 
consider any mitigating measures such as those described in the remainder of this section. 
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Figure 29.  Core damage risk as a function of increasing the separation distance between the hydrogen 
production facility and the nuclear plant. 
The results shown in Figure 29 follow the general curve shown where the risk level decreases slowly 
until reaching separation distances greater than 100 m.  The driver for this behavior is that for separation 
distances less than 100 m, the risk is dominated by scenarios where hydrogen detonation events damage 
the reactor facility leading to structural damage and consequential core damage.  As the separation 
distance increases, the likelihood of structural damage from a detonation drops and eventually goes to 
zero—however, other types of core damage scenarios then become more likely (such as the hydrogen 
detonation leading to a plant upset condition that then leads to core damage).  The scenarios that occur for 
large separation distances (greater than 120 m) have very low risk, on the order of 1E-9/yr.  
Consequently, the two types of scenarios contribute to the overall risk at the intermediate (80 to 120 m) 
separation distances. 
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When the separation distance is increased to the maximum we evaluated (140 m), the frequency of 
dispersion events does not change, since it is the explosion within the chemical facility that results in the 
dispersion.  And, at this maximum distance, the consequences of the dispersion event only changes 
minimally, since the dispersion footprint is measured in hundreds of meters (see Appendix A). 
3.2 Case 2:  Construct a Barrier between the Facilities 
In order to mitigate potential detonation events that are initiated from the hydrogen facility and 
impact the nuclear plant, an earth barrier may be placed directly between the two facilities.  This scenario 
is illustrated in
Figure 30.  If the barrier is at a height approximately equal to the nuclear facility, blast waves from a 
detonation originating from the hydrogen production facility will be dampened and reflected away from 
the nuclear structure.  To model this situation, we set the probability of structural damage from hydrogen 
detonation scenarios to zero.  Under this assumption, the mean core damage risk decreases to 4E-10/yr, 
resulting in a negligible core damage frequency.  However, the mean frequency of dispersion events stays 
at 3E-3/yr since the barrier does nothing to prevent upsets in the chemical facility. Additionally, the 
barrier is not expected to be high enough from the ground level to block chemical dispersion events from 
reaching the nuclear facility if the dispersion event occurs. 
Figure 30.  Case 2:  Constructing an earthen barrier between the nuclear and chemical facilities. 
3.3 Case 3: Construct the Nuclear Facility Underground 
The current point design for the HTGR has considered and suggested that the entire reactor 
confinement structure be placed underground (MacDonald 2003).  However, we considered accident 
scenarios that potentially damage aboveground structures that, if compromised, may then affect other 
portions of the plant located below these structures.  We did not assume that a core damage condition 
would directly result from this type of scenario, but there was a nonnegligible probability of seeing core 
damage as a result of the hydrogen detonation and subsequent structural damage. 
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Scenario Case III considers the net reduction in risk if all major nuclear-related structural bodies 
were located underground, out of the reach of any possible hydrogen blast effects (see Figure 31 for an 
illustration).  For this situation, we would be precluding the possibility of core damage from structural 
damage.  But other risks, such as hydrogen explosions causing plant transients or losses of offsite power, 
are still considered. 
Figure 31.  Case 3:  Constructing the nuclear facility primarily underground. 
To model the situation where the nuclear plant is underground, we set the probability of structural 
damage from hydrogen detonation scenarios to zero.  Under this assumption, the mean core damage risk 
decreases to 4E-10/yr, resulting in a negligible core damage frequency.  Note that we did not consider a 
potential reduction in dispersion risk events since the control room, while underground, would still 
require intake structures above ground. 
3.4 Case 4:  Construct Blast Panels near the Chemical Facility 
Like Case II, this sensitivity case focuses on the construction of a passive system designed to 
mitigate the hazards associated with hydrogen detonation and deflagration events.  This case, however, 
focuses on the construction of blast panels between the hydrogen storage and the nuclear facility (see 
Figure 32 for an illustration).  The goal of the blast panels is to dampen the detonation shock wave—in 
other words, the panels are a surrogate for increasing the separation distance.  To model this situation, we 
set the probability of structural damage from hydrogen detonation scenarios to zero.  Under this 
assumption, the mean core damage risk is 4E-10/yr.  Note that for this analysis, we assumed that the 
panels themselves would not become airborne missiles (for example, by permanently attaching one side 
of the panel to a fixed structure) or, if the panel does become airborne, the energy imparted to the panel 
will not be sufficient to cause enough structural damage to the nuclear facility to result in core damage. 
Again, the mean frequency of dispersion events stays at 3E-3/yr, since the barrier does little to 
prevent upsets in the chemical facility.  
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Figure 32.  Case 4: Constructing blast panels near the chemical facility to dampen overpressure events. 
3.5 Case 5:  Construct the Chemical Facility Underground 
In this sensitivity case, we propose to construct critical portions of the chemical facility underground 
(see Figure 33).  The scenario considers the net reduction in both core damage risk (the shock wave from 
a hydrogen detonation would be dampened by the ground) and the potential for mitigating chemical 
releases.  If key chemical systems were located underground, where pathways to the surface are filtered, 
then the frequency of unfiltered chemical releases would be below the nominal release frequency. 
To model the situation where the chemical facility is underground, we set the probability of 
structural damage from hydrogen detonation scenarios to zero.  Further, we set the conditional probability 
of having a hydrogen explosion (which causes the chemical release) to zero.  Under these two 
assumptions, the mean core damage risk decreases to 8E-11/yr, resulting in a negligible core damage 
frequency.  The mean chemical dispersion release frequency decreased to 8E-4/yr.  
Figure 33.  Case 5:  Constructing the chemical facility primarily underground. 
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3.6 Case 6:  Move the Control Room Offsite 
As shown in Figure 34, in this sensitivity case we consider the possibility of moving the nuclear 
facility control room offsite, where offsite implies that the control room would be at a sufficient distance 
to preclude impacts from chemical dispersion events.  This option does not affect the core damage risk 
from hydrogen events, but does mitigate the impacts from dispersion scenarios.  By locating the control 
room portion of the plant away from the chemical facility at a significant distance (greater than 500 m), 
the evaluation and guidance provided by RG 1.78 would be met and would minimize control room 
habitability as one of the potential licensing issues.  Further, if the HTGR design requires multiple 
reactors, a single centralized control room location shared by the multiple units may be able to use the 
segregation of the control room as an efficiency measure.  
Figure 34.  Case 6:  Moving the nuclear plant control room offsite. 
3.7 Summary of the Sensitivity Cases 
The results of the sensitivity cases are shown in Table 7, where we list the mean core damage 
frequency and dispersion frequency for the cases.  A couple of observations can be extracted from these 
cases.  First, implementing a passive barrier (for example, earth or blast panels) between the chemical 
facility and the nuclear plant yields a significant decrease in the core damage frequency.  Second, several 
of the cases did little to improve the dispersion frequency (or the associated consequences) of chemical 
releases, simply due to the difficulty in containing dispersion events.  The one case that had the largest 
improvement relating to the dispersion risk was that of relocating the nuclear control room offsite.  Third, 
when the separation distance is less than 100 m, the core damage frequency is large enough to result in 
possible licensing issues in a risk-informed environment such as that described be RG 1.174—hence, the 
need for either mitigating the risk by using one of the analyzed options or increasing the separation 
distance to at least 110 m. 
Another item to consider in mitigating risk related to chemical dispersion events is to not use 
hydrogen-production chemical cycles that use hazardous chemicals.  For example, the electrolysis option, 
while still producing hydrogen (and incurring the core damage risk associated with that gas), would 
eliminate the dispersion risk and reduce the need to relocate the reactor control room.
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Table 7.  Summary results from the sensitivity cases. 
Case Description
Mean Core
Damage Frequency 
(per year) 
Mean Chemical 
Dispersion Frequency 
(per year) 
Nominal No mitigating features and the separation 
distance set at 60 m 
7E-6 3E-3 
1. Varying the separation distance between the 
nuclear and hydrogen production facilities 
See Figure 29 3E-3 
2. Constructing an earthen barrier between the 
nuclear and chemical facilities 
 4E-10 3E-3 
3. Constructing the nuclear facility primarily 
underground 
 4E-10 3E-3 
4. Constructing blast panels near the chemical 
facility to dampen overpressure events 
 4E-10 3E-3 
5. Constructing the chemical facility primarily 
underground 
 8E-11 8E-4 
6. Moving the nuclear plant control room 
offsite
 7E-6 Releases no longer 
impact control room 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
This report provides an overview of the objectives, methods, and models used to evaluate locating a 
hydrogen production facility near a nuclear power plant (e.g., very-high-temperature gas reactor).  In 
order to answer safety related questions for this nuclear and chemical facility, we utilized standard PSA 
methodologies to answer three questions:  (1) what can happen, (2) how likely is it, and (3) what are the 
consequences?  As part of answering these questions, we developed a model suitable to determine 
separation distances for hydrogen process structures and the nuclear plant structures. 
To recall our motivations for this work, we iterate our primary and secondary objectives: 
1. The primary objective of the model-development and analysis is to answer key safety questions 
related to the placement of one (or more) hydrogen production plant in the vicinity of one (or more) 
high-temperature nuclear reactor.  From a thermal-hydraulic standpoint we would like the two 
facilities to be quite close.  However, safety and regulatory implications force the separation distance 
to be increased, perhaps substantially.  Without answering the safety questions posed in this report, 
the likelihood for obtaining a permit to construct and build such as facility in the U.S. would be 
questionable. 
2. The secondary objective of the model-development and analysis is to provide decision makers with 
tools and insights into potential engineering designs that may mitigate hazards inherent in the 
coupling of nuclear and hydrogen production facilities.  These safety-based tools allow for the 
selection of a variety of facility types (e.g., different chemical processes, safety barriers) in addition 
to the ability to estimate risk as the separation distance is modified. 
The quantitative analysis performed for this report provides us with a scoping mechanism to 
determine key design parameters relating to the development of a nuclear-based hydrogen production 
facility.  From the quantitative analysis and the assumptions that went into the risk evaluation, we have 
determined recommendations that should be considered as the facility design is refined.  These 
recommendations are based upon the risk analysis results, including potential changes to the nominal risk 
(see Table 8) as facility modification are made to mitigate risk.  From our sensitivity calculations, we see 
that when the separation distance is less than 100 m, the core damage frequency is large enough (greater 
than 1E-6/yr) to become problematic in a risk-informed environment.   
Table 8.  Mean risk results for the hydrogen plant SAPHIRE risk model. 
Case
Core Damage Frequency 
(per year) 
Dispersion Frequency 
(per year) 
Nominal (separation 
distance of 60 m) 
7E-6 3E-3 
By using a combination of risk-mitigating designs, for example placing an earth blast barrier 
between the chemical facility and the nuclear plant and moving the control room offsite, the separation 
distance can be decreased.  However, as the separation distance is decreased, the risk-mitigating features 
may become harder to construct.  In the case of the earth barrier, a limited horizontal distance would 
translate into a limited vertical distance, which may not be large enough to effectively prevent damage 
from hydrogen detonation events. 
x We recommend that a separation distance of between 60 to 120 m be considered for the base design 
of the hydrogen production facility.  This separation distance should be coupled with a blast 
barrier(s) sufficient to prevent hydrogen detonation events from damaging the nuclear structures.  In 
lieu of any mitigating barriers, the separation distance should be at least 110 m. 
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x We recommend that as hydrogen is produced, it is transferred offsite for compression and storage, 
thereby limiting the overall on-site storage (i.e., near the nuclear facility) in a single location to less 
than 100 kg of hydrogen.  In general, there should be a conscientious effort in the chemical facility 
design process to minimize the storage of combustible gasses near the point of production. 
x We recommend the hydrogen distribution system use an inerted (i.e., low oxygen concentration), co-
axial piping system to minimize the potential for hydrogen leaks resulting in either a deflagration or 
detonation.  Hydrogen is a difficult gas to prevent from leaking, so a passive design should funnel 
leaking hydrogen away from critical areas of the plant. 
x We recommend that the control room for the nuclear plant be located offsite and away from the 
chemical hazards posed by the hydrogen production facility.  The offsite control room design should 
consider redundant data paths to the reactor to offset risks associated with locating the control room 
away from the nuclear plant. 
x We recommend that a detailed PSA be performed for the VHTGR and the chemical facility as the 
design details become mature.  For the analysis in this report, we had to rely on a limited PSA, 
performed over 20 years ago on a similar type of plant—this older plant type may have limited 
applicability to newer designs. 
x We recommend that in addition to the major nuclear plant structures and systems being constructed 
below ground level, that where possible critical portions of the chemical facility be considered for 
belowground placement.  The definition of critical in relation to the chemical facility refers to those 
parts of the process equipment that contain significant quantities of either hazardous chemicals or 
provide storage for combustible gas such as hydrogen. 
By considering a variety of passive design measures aimed at mitigating risk, it is possible to ensure 
that adequate safety levels are maintained for the nuclear plant.  Next-generation advanced reactors such 
as the VHTGR are being designed to be safer than the current fleet of light-water reactors over a wide 
variety of upset conditions, including those conditions that may be seen from the adjoining hydrogen 
production facility. 
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Appendix A 
Potential Chemical Hazards 
A-1. Introduction 
Generating hydrogen using a thermochemical process requires both heat and various chemicals, 
some of which might be hazardous.  The concern partially addressed here is the hazard these various 
chemicals might pose to safety if an accident were to occur and a quantity of these chemicals were 
released into the atmosphere.  The approach taken to address this concern comprises a series of steps:  
1. Survey the different thermochemical processes that have been proposed for generating hydrogen 
2. List the chemicals used in each process 
3. Compare this list of chemicals to those identified by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) as Extremely Hazardous Substances (EHS) 
4. Analyze the chemicals that appear on both lists, using the ALOHA code to assess the hazard from a 
release of one of these chemicals into the atmosphere. 
A-2.  Survey of Thermochemical Processes 
General Atomics led a program funded by a DOE NERI grant, titled High Efficiency Generation of 
Hydrogen Fuels Using Nuclear Power [GA 2003], that included an evaluation of many proposed 
thermochemical processes.  That program first identified and organized over 100 thermochemical water-
splitting cycles, then performed a screening that reduced the number to 25, which were then the subjects 
of more detailed study.  The 25 processes that survived the initial screening are listed in Table A-1. 
Table A-1.  Water-splitting thermochemical processes. 
Cycle Name Reaction 
 1 Westinghouse 2H2SO4(g)ĺ 2SO2(g) + 2H2O(g) + O2(g) 
SO2(g) + 2H2O(a)ĺ H2SO4(a) + H2(g)
 2 Ispra Mark 2H2SO4(g)ĺ 2SO2(g) + 2H2O(g) + O2(g) 
2HBr(a)ĺ Br2(a) + H2(g)
Br2(l) + SO2(g) + 2H2O(l)ĺ 2HBr(g) + H2SO4(a)
 3 UT-3 Univ. of Tokyo 2Br2(g) + 2CaO ĺ 2CaBr2 + O2(g)
3FeBr2 + 4H2Oĺ Fe3O4 + 6HBr + H2(g) 
CaBr2 + H2Oĺ CaO + 2HBr 
Fe3O4 + 8HBr ĺ Br2 + 3FeBr2 + 4H2O
 4 Sulfur-Iodine 2H2SO4(g)ĺ 2SO2(g) + 2H2O(g) + O2(g) 
2HI ĺ I2(g) + H2(g)
I2 + SO2(a) + 2H2Oĺ 2HI(a) + H2SO4(a) 
 5 Julich Center EOS 2Fe3O4 + 6FeSO4ĺ 6Fe2O3 + 6SO2 + O2(g)
3FeO + H2Oĺ Fe3O4 + H2(g)
Fe2O3 + SO2ĺ FeO + FeSO4
 6 Tokyo Inst. Tech. Ferrite 2MnFe2O4 + 3Na2CO3 + H2Oĺ 2Na3MnFe2O6 + 3CO2(g) + H2(g)
4Na3MnFe2O6 + 6CO2(g)ĺ 4MnFe2O4 + 6Na2CO3 + O2(g)
A-4
Cycle Name Reaction 
 7 Hallett Air Products 2Cl2(g) + 2H2O(g) ĺ 4HCl(g) + O2(g)
2HCl ĺ Cl2(g) + H2(g)
 8 Gaz de France  2K + 2KOH ĺ 2K2O + H2(g)
2K2Oĺ 2K + K2O2
2K2O2 + 2H2Oĺ 4KOH + O2(g)
 9 Nickel Ferrite NiMnFe4O6 + 2H2Oĺ NiMnFe4O8 + 2H2(g) 
NiMnFe4O8ĺ NiMnFe4O6 + O2(g)
 10 Aachen Univ. Julich 2Cl2(g) + 2H2O(g) ĺ 4HCl(g) + O2(g)
2CrCl2 + 2HCl ĺ 2CrCl3 + H2(g)
2CrCl3 + 2CrCl2 + Cl2(g) 
 11 Ispra Mark 1C 2CuBr2 + Ca(OH)2ĺ 2CuO + 2CaBr2 + H2O
4CuO(s) ĺ 2Cu2O(s) + O2(g)
CaBr2 + 2H2O ĺ Ca(OH)2 + 2HBr 
Cu2O + 4HBr ĺ 2CuBr2 + H2(g) + H2O
 12 LASL-U 3CO2 + U3O8 + H2Oĺ 3UO2CO3 + H2(g)
3UO2CO3ĺ 3CO2(g) + 3UO3
6UO3(s)ĺ 2U3O8(s) + O2(g) 
 13 Ispra Mark 8 3MnCl2 + 4H2Oĺ Mn3O4 + 6HCl + H2(g) 
3MnO2ĺ Mn3O4 + O2(g)
4HCl + Mn3O4ĺ 2MnCl2(a) + MnO2 + 2H2O
 14 Ispra Mark 6 2Cl2(g) + 2H2O(g) ĺ 4HCl(g) + O2(g)
2CrCl2 + 2HCl ĺ 2CrCl3 + H2(g)
2CrCl3 + 2FeCl2ĺ 2CrCl2 + 2FeCl3
2FeCl3ĺ Cl2(g) + 2FeCl2
 15 Ispra Mark 4 2Cl2(g) + 2H2O(g) ĺ 4HCl(g) + O2(g)
2FeCl2 + 2HCl + S ĺ 2FeCl3 + H2S
2FeCl3ĺ Cl2(g) + 2FeCl2
H2Sĺ S + H2(g)
 16 Ispra Mark 3 2Cl2(g) + 2H2O(g) ĺ 4HCl(g) + O2(g)
2VOCl2 + 2HCl ĺ  2VOCl3 + H2(g)
2VOCl3ĺ Cl2(g) + 2VOCl2
 17 Ispra Mark 2 Na2O.MnO2 + H2Oĺ 2NaOH(a) + MnO2
4MnO2(s)ĺ 2Mn2O3(s) + O2(g)
Mn2O3 + 4NaOH ĺ 2Na2O.MnO2 + H2(g) + H2O
 18 Ispra CO/Mn3O4 6Mn2O3ĺ 4Mn3O4 + O2(g)
C(s) + H2O(g) ĺ CO(g) + H2(g)
CO(g) +2Mn3O4ĺ C + 3Mn2O3
 19 Ispra Mark 7B 2Fe2O3 + 6Cl2(g)ĺ 4FeCl3 + 3O2(g) 
2FeCl3ĺ Cl2(g) + 2FeCl2
3FeCl2 + 4H2Oĺ Fe3O4 + 6HCl + H2(g) 
4Fe3O4 + O2(g)ĺ 6Fe2O3
4HCl + O2(g)ĺ 2Cl2(g) + 2H2O
A-5
Cycle Name Reaction 
 20 Vanadium Chloride 2Cl2(g) + 2H2O(g) ĺ 4HCl(g) + O2(g)
2HCl + 2VCl2ĺ 2VCl3 + H2(g)
2VCl3ĺ VCl4 + VCl2
2VCl4ĺ Cl2(g) + 2VCl3
 21 Mark 7A 2FeCl3(l)ĺ Cl2(g) + 2FeCl2
3FeCl2 + 4H2O(g) ĺ Fe3O4 + 6HCl(g) + H2(g)
4Fe3O4 + O2(g)ĺ 6Fe2O3
6Cl2(g) + 2Fe2O3ĺ 4FeCl3(g) + 3O2(g)
Fe2O3 + 6HCl(a) ĺ 2FeCl3(a) + 3H2O(l)
 22 GA Cycle 23 H2S(g)ĺ S(g) + H2(g)
2H2SO4(g)ĺ 2SO2(g) + 2H2O(g) + O2(g) 
3S + 2H2O(g) ĺ 2H2S(g) + SO2(g)
3SO2(g) + 2H2O(l)ĺ 2H2SO4(a) + S 
S(g) + O2(g)ĺ SO2(g)
 23 US-Chlorine 2Cl2(g) + 2H2O(g) ĺ 4HCl(g) + O2(g)
2CuCl + 2HCl ĺ 2CuCl2 + H2(g)
2CuCl2ĺ 2CuCl  + Cl2(g)
 24 Ispra Mark 9 2FeCl3ĺ Cl2(g) + 2FeCl2
3Cl2(g) + 2Fe3O4 + 12HCl ĺ 6FeCl3 + 6H2O + O2(g)
3FeCl2 + 4H2Oĺ Fe3O4 + 6HCl + H2(g) 
 25 Ispra Mark 6C 2Cl2(g) + 2H2O(g) ĺ 4HCl(g) + O2(g)
2CrCl2 + 2HCl ĺ 2CrCl3 + H2(g)
2CrCl3 + 2FeCl2ĺ 2CrCl2 + 2FeCl3
2CuCl2ĺ 2CuCl + Cl2(g) 
CuCl + FeCl3ĺ CuCl2 + FeCl2
A-3. Chemical List 
Each of the 25 water-splitting thermochemical processes was reviewed, and the constituent 
chemicals used in the processes were identified.  This review produced a total of 58 unique chemicals.  
This list of chemicals is presented in Table A-2. 
Table A-2.  Chemicals found in water-splitting thermochemical processes. 
CASa Number Formula Chemical Name 
Molecular
Weight (g/mole) 
10025-73-7 Cr-Cl3 CHROMIC CHLORIDE 158.35 
10034-85-2 H-I hydrogen iodide  127.912 
10035-10-6 H-Br Hydrogen bromide  80.912 
10049-05-5 Cr-Cl2 CHROMOUS CHLORIDE 122.9 
10213-09-9 V-O-Cl2 vanadyl dichloride  137.85 
10580-52-6 V-Cl2 vanadium dichloride  121.85 
12136-45-7 K2-O POTASSIUM MONOXIDE 94.1794 
124-38-9 C-O2 carbon dioxide  44.01 
1305-62-0 Ca-(OH)2 Calcium hydroxide  74.09 
1305-78-8 Ca-O Calcium oxide 56.0794 
1309-37-1 Fe2-O3 Iron(III) oxide  159.69 
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CASa Number Formula Chemical Name 
Molecular
Weight (g/mole) 
1310-58-3 K-O-H POTASSIUM HYDROXIDE 56.106 
1310-73-2 Na-O-H sodium hydroxide  39.997 
1313-13-9 Mn-O2 Manganese(IV) oxide  86.94 
1317-34-6 Mn2-O3 Manganese(III) oxide  157.8742 
1317-35-7 Mn3-O4 Manganese Tetroxide (AS MN) 228.81 
1317-38-0 Cu-O Cupric oxide  79.5454 
1317-39-1 Cu2-O Cuprous oxide  143.0914 
1317-61-9 Fe3-O4 Iron(II, III) oxide  231.5326 
1333-74-0 H2 Hydrogen 2.016 
1344-58-7 U-O3 Uranium trioxide 286.03 
1344-59-8 U3-O8 Uranium(V,VI) oxide (pitchblende) 842.08 
1345-25-1 Fe-O Iron(II) oxide  71.8444 
17014-71-0 K2-O2 POTASSIUM PEROXIDE 110.1788 
497-19-8 Na2-C-O3 Sodium carbonate  105.99 
630-08-0 C-O carbon monoxide  28.01 
7440-09-7 K potassium 39.098 
7440-44-0  C carbon 12.011 
7446-09-5 S-O2 SULFUR DIOXIDE 64.065 
7447-39-4 Cu-Cl2 cupric chloride  134.451 
7553-56-2 I2 iodine 253.809 
7632-51-1 V-Cl4 vanadium tetrachloride  192.752 
7647-01-0 H-Cl hydrogen chloride  36.461 
7664-93-9 H2-S-O4 SULFURIC ACID 98.079 
7446-11-9 S-O3 Sulfur trioxide 80.06 
7704-34-9 S sulfur 32.066 
7705-08-0 Fe-Cl3 FERRIC CHLORIDE 162.205 
7718-98-1 V-Cl3 vanadium trichloride  157.3 
7720-78-7  Fe-S-O4 Ferrous sulfate  151.9026 
7726-95-6 Br2 Bromine 159.808 
7727-18-6 V-O-Cl3 vanadium oxytrichloride  173.299 
7732-18-5  H2-O Water 18.015 
7758-89-6 Cu-Cl cuprous chloride  98.999 
7758-94-3 Fe-Cl2 FERROUS CHLORIDE 126.752 
7773-01-5 Mn-Cl2 manganese chloride  125.843 
7782-44-7 O2 Oxygen 31.999 
7782-50-5 Cl2 CHLORINE 70.905 
7783-06-4 H2-S hydrogen sulfide  34.082 
7789-41-5 Ca-Br2 Calcium Bromide 199.89 
7789-45-9 Cu-Br2 COPPER BROMIDE 223.354 
7789-46-0 Fe-Br2 Ferrous bromide  215.653 
--
b
Mn-Fe2-O4 --  
-- Na2-O.-Mn-O2 --  
-- Na3-Mn-Fe2-O6 --  
-- Ni-Mn-Fe4-O6 --  
-- Ni-Mn-Fe4-O8 --  
-- U-O2-C-O3 uranyl carbonate (rutherfordine) 330.08 
a.  Chemical Abstract Service. 
b.  No information on this chemical could be found. 
A-7
A-4. Extremely Hazardous Substances 
The list of chemicals from Table A-2 was then compared to the extremely hazardous substances 
(EHS) list [40 CFR 355] maintained by the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  The EPA list 
of EHS identifies those chemicals whose presence is required to be reported to local officials for 
emergency planning purposes if the quantity exceeds a certain threshold.  This quantity is defined as the 
threshold planning quantity (TPQ).  The EPA also provides guidance on concentrations of EHSs that are 
of concern.  Over the last 20 years or so, various limits have been proposed from a number of different 
organizations.  However, the recent practice being embraced by both EPA and DOE is to adopt the 
Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs) developed by American Industrial Hygiene 
Association (AIHA) (AIHA 2003).  These ERPGs are defined in Table A-3. 
Table A-3.  Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG) definitions. 
Level of 
Concern Description
ERPG-1 Maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all 
individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing other than 
mild transient adverse health effects or perceiving a clearly defined objectionable 
odor.
ERPG-2 The maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all 
individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing or developing 
irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms which could impair an 
individuals ability to take protective action. 
ERPG-3 The maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all 
individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing or developing 
life-threatening health effects. 
Table A-4 lists those chemicals from Table A-2 that are categorized by the EPA as EHS.  Also listed 
on Table A-4 are the recommended concentrations for emergency response planning.   
Each of the chemicals listed in Table A-4 were examined as a possible subject for atmospheric 
dispersion, given an accidental release into the environment.  The ALOHA code [EPA 2004] was chosen 
as the tool for assessing the hazard from an atmospheric release of the chemicals listed in Table A-4.  
ALOHA was developed jointly by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and 
the U.S. EPA, and is designed especially for use by people responding to chemical accidents, as well as 
for emergency planning and training.  Because it is an atmospheric dispersion analysis code, ALOHA is 
not for use with hazardous solid or liquid material.  Two chemicals on Table A-4 fall into this category.  
Chromic chloride is a solid and sulfuric acid is a liquid.  Therefore, ALOHA cannot be used to assess the 
hazard associated with these chemicals and were excluded from further analysis.  Note that ALOHA does 
not model liquid vapor releases—this limitation will restrict the modeling of upsets where high-
temperature sulfuric acid is released.  However, we did look at dispersion of sulfur trioxide, which is 
released from high-temperature sulfuric acid.   
Without site-specific or process-specific information on facility to be analyzed, worst-case 
conservative assumptions were made in performing the dispersion calculations.  Guidance for these 
assumptions was taken from a hazard analysis guidance document developed by the EPA (EPA 1987).  
The guidance on worst-case analyses provided the inputs for such details as the characteristics of the 
release, the local climatic conditions and the surrounding terrain.  However, the quantity of the EHS 
released still needed to be determined.  For this input a simple assumption was made concerning the 
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hydrogen generation process.  It was assumed that the amount of EHS that could be release is equivalent 
to the amount of the chemical needed to produce a specified quantity of hydrogen in a daily batch 
process.  In the following presentation of results, this quantity is referred to as the Equivalent Daily Batch 
Process Inventory (EDBPI).  The atmospheric dispersion calculations were then performed assuming 
various quantities of daily hydrogen generation. 
The final assumption relates to the concentration of the EHS that poses the level of concern (LOC) 
that is most relevant to the situation under consideration.  Here, the LOC chosen is the EPRG-3 levels 
under the assumption that the population at risk is the work force of the nuclear plant providing heat for 
the thermochemical process. 
Calculating the ERPG-3 levels for the EHS in the EDBPI quantities associated with a range of 
hydrogen production levels assuming worst-case release conditions yields the result presented in 
Table A-5 and in Figure A-1. 
A sensitivity calculation was performed to estimate the effect of varying the input values from worst-
case to a more realistic situation.  Using bromine and worst-case weather and release characteristics, 
produces the ERPG footprint shown in Figure A-2.  Figure A-3 illustrates the result of changing from a 
worst-case calculation to more realistic release and weather pattern.  In this sensitivity case, bromine is 
used assuming a quantity equivalent to 100 kg of hydrogen production.  In the worst case calculation, the 
entire quantity of bromine (7,911 kg) is assumed to be instantaneously released into a stable slow wind 
(1.5 m/sec).  The sensitivity case assumes the bromine is stored in a spherical tank, 2-meters in diameter, 
which has 100-cm diameter hole 25% from the bottom of the tank.  Weather conditions are assumed to be 
more typical (slightly stronger wind and medium stability).  Under these conditions, the ERPG footprint 
is reduced from the worst case ERPG-3 footprint of 5.2 km (see Table A-5 and Figure A-2) to 1.9 km.  A 
second sensitivity case was then calculated that only changed the air temperature from 70oF to 30oF.  This 
single change resulted in a further reduction of the ERPG footprint (shown on Figure A-4) from 1.9 km to 
1.1 km. 
A-5. Conclusions and Observations 
Any significant release of a hazardous material will pose significant problems.  However, not all 
thermochemical processes used for generating hydrogen use hazardous materials.  Further, the quantity of 
material stored on-site to support the hydrogen generation process is still an unknown.  Simplistic 
assumptions were made to derive the quantities used here.  For our analysis, the quantity assumed is 
based on the amount needed for to produce a specified quantity of hydrogen in one day in a batch type of 
process.  Also, since the total quantity of material is not likely to be stored in a single location (as 
assumed here), further sensitivity studies will help to assess more realistic situations.  Nevertheless, it 
appears prudent that wherever possible, any hazardous material should be stored in a down-wind location 
from the rest of the plant or the nuclear generating facility.  Other passive measures of mitigating risks 
will be evaluated in a later report. 
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Figure A-1.  Plot of ERPG-3 footprints (in km) for the EHS quantities associated with different levels of 
daily hydrogen production (in kg), assuming worst-case release conditions. 
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Figure A-2.  ERPG footprint for bromine (7,911 kg, equivalent to 100 kg of hydrogen production) is 
shown, assuming worst case conditions.  ERPG-3 distance is 5.2 km.
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Figure A-3.  ERPG footprint for bromine (7,911 kg, equivalent to 100 kg of hydrogen production), using 
realistic weather characteristics and bromine released from 2-m-diameter tank with 100-cm hole 25% 
from bottom of the tank. 
0 2 4 6 8 10 
4
2
0
2
4
 kilometers
 kilometers 
5 ppm = ERPG-3
0.5 ppm = ERPG-2
0.1 ppm = ERPG-1
Figure A-4.  Bromine ERPG footprint illustrating the effect of changing air temperature from 70ºF to 
30ºF (compare to Figure A-2).  ERPG-3 footprint reduces from 1.9 km to 1.1 km. 
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Appendix B 
Basic Event Parameters from the  
SAPHIRE Hydrogen Facility Risk Model 
In this appendix, we provide information on the SAPHIRE risk model basic events, including the 
event name, probability (or frequency, per year, if it is an initiating event), uncertainty distribution type 
and parameters, description, 95th percentile value of the uncertainty distribution, and supplementary notes, 
as illustrated below. 
NAME Probability Uncertainty 
    Description 95th percentile 
Note:
CD-PLTUPSET 1.00E-07  Constrained non-informative 
    CORE DAMAGE GIVEN A PLANT UPSET  95th = 4.35E-7 
Note:
CORE-DAMGAGE-1 2.00E-02  Constrained non-informative 
    PROB OF CD GIVEN STRUCT FAILURE  95th = 8.65E-2 
Note:
CS-STRUCT-DAM 9.75E-02  Constrained non-informative 
    NPP STRUCTURAL DAMAGE  95th = 4.04E-1 
Note:
EXPL-H2LEAK 2.50E-01  Beta(6.5, 19.5) 
    EXPLOSION DUE TO HYDROGEN LEAK  95th = 3.98E-1 
Note:
GLEVEL1 8.33E-04  Constrained non-informative 
    SEISMIC G-LEVEL 1  95th = 3.62E-3 
Note:
GLEVEL2 9.91E-05  Constrained non-informative 
    SEISMIC G-LEVEL 2  95th = 4.31E-4 
Note:
GLEVEL3 2.41E-05  Constrained non-informative 
    SEISMIC G-LEVEL 3  95th = 1.05E-4 
Note:
H2S-ACC-EQ-1S1 1.45E-12  Constrained non-informative 
    ACCUMULATOR 1 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.1g)  95th = 6.30E-12 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-ACC-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
H2S-ACC-EQ-1S2 1.11E-06  Constrained non-informative 
    ACCUMULATOR 1 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.3g)  95th = 4.84E-6 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-ACC-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
H2S-ACC-EQ-1S3 1.43E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    ACCUMULATOR 1 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.6g)  95th = 6.22E-3 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-ACC-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
H2S-ACC-EQ-2S1 1.45E-12  Constrained non-informative 
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    ACCUMULATOR 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.1g)  95th = 6.30E-12 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-ACC-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
H2S-ACC-EQ-2S2 1.11E-06  Constrained non-informative 
    ACCUMULATOR 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.3g)  95th = 4.84E-6 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-ACC-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
H2S-ACC-EQ-2S3 1.43E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    ACCUMULATOR 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.6g)  95th = 6.22E-3 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-ACC-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
H2S-ACC-OP-1 5.00E-09  Lognormal(EF=30.0) 
    H2 ACCUMULATOR 1 FAILS DUE TO 
OVERPRESSURIZATION 
 95th = 1.77E-8 
Note:
H2S-ACC-OP-2 5.00E-09  Lognormal(EF=30.0) 
    H2 ACCUMULATOR 2 FAILS DUE TO 
OVERPRESSURIZATION 
 95th = 1.77E-8 
Note:
H2S-CHL-ACCDIS 3.00E-07  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    COOLING UNIT RUPTURE  95th = 1.13E-6 
Note:
H2S-CHL-COMP1 3.00E-07  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    COMPRESSOR 1 COOLING UNIT RUPTURE  95th = 1.13E-6 
Note:
H2S-CHL-COMP2 3.00E-07  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    COMPRESSOR 2 COOLING UNIT RUPTURE  95th = 1.13E-6 
Note:
H2S-CHL-COMP3 3.00E-07  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    COMPRESSOR 3 COOLING UNIT RUPTURE  95th = 1.13E-6 
Note:
H2S-CHL-EQ-ADS1 8.44E-11  Constrained non-informative 
    ACC COOLING UNIT SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.1g)  95th = 3.67E-10 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-HTX-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
H2S-CHL-EQ-ADS2 1.81E-05  Constrained non-informative 
    ACC COOLING UNIT SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.3g)  95th = 7.87E-5 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-HTX-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
H2S-CHL-EQ-ADS3 8.47E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    ACC COOLING UNIT SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.6g)  95th = 3.67E-2 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-HTX-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
H2S-CHL-EQ-COMP1S1 8.44E-11  Constrained non-informative 
    COMP 1 COOLING UNIT SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.1g)  95th = 3.67E-10 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-HTX-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
H2S-CHL-EQ-COMP1S2 1.81E-05  Constrained non-informative 
    COMP 1 COOLING UNIT SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.3g)  95th = 7.87E-5 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-HTX-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
H2S-CHL-EQ-COMP1S3 8.47E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    COMP 1 COOLING UNIT SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.6g)  95th = 3.67E-2 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-HTX-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
H2S-CHL-EQ-COMP2S1 8.44E-11  Constrained non-informative 
    COMP 2 COOLING UNIT SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.1g)  95th = 3.67E-10 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-HTX-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
H2S-CHL-EQ-COMP2S2 1.81E-05  Constrained non-informative 
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    COMP 2 COOLING UNIT SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.3g)  95th = 7.87E-5 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-HTX-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
H2S-CHL-EQ-COMP2S3 8.47E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    COMP 2 COOLING UNIT SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.6g)  95th = 3.67E-2 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-HTX-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
H2S-CHL-EQ-COMP3S1 8.44E-11  Constrained non-informative 
    COMP 3 COOLING UNIT SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.1g)  95th = 3.67E-10 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-HTX-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
H2S-CHL-EQ-COMP3S2 1.81E-05  Constrained non-informative 
    COMP 3 COOLING UNIT SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.3g)  95th = 7.87E-5 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-HTX-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
H2S-CHL-EQ-COMP3S3 8.47E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    COMP 3 COOLING UNIT SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.6g)  95th = 3.67E-2 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-HTX-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
H2S-MDC-RP-COMP1 3.00E-07  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    COMPRESSOR 1 LEAKS  95th = 1.13E-6 
Note:
H2S-MDC-RP-COMP2 3.00E-07  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    COMPRESSOR 2 LEAKS  95th = 1.13E-6 
Note:
H2S-MDC-RP-COMP3 3.00E-07  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    COMPRESSOR 3 LEAKS  95th = 1.13E-6 
Note:
H2S-MOV-EQ-A10S1 1.26E-09  Constrained non-informative 
    ACC MOV 1 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.1g)  95th = 5.48E-9 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
H2S-MOV-EQ-A10S2 1.04E-05  Constrained non-informative 
    ACC MOV 1 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.3g)  95th = 4.52E-5 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
H2S-MOV-EQ-A10S3 1.65E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    ACC MOV 1 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.6g)  95th = 7.17E-3 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
H2S-MOV-EQ-A20S1 1.26E-09  Constrained non-informative 
    ACC MOV 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.1g)  95th = 5.48E-9 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
H2S-MOV-EQ-A20S2 1.04E-05  Constrained non-informative 
    ACC MOV 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.3g)  95th = 4.52E-5 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
H2S-MOV-EQ-A20S3 1.65E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    ACC MOV 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.6g)  95th = 7.17E-3 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
H2S-MOV-EQ-V1IS1 1.26E-09  Constrained non-informative 
    PV INLET MOV 1 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.1g)  95th = 5.48E-9 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
H2S-MOV-EQ-V1IS2 1.04E-05  Constrained non-informative 
    PV INLET MOV 1 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.3g)  95th = 4.52E-5 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
H2S-MOV-EQ-V1IS3 1.65E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    PV INLET MOV 1 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.6g)  95th = 7.17E-3 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
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H2S-MOV-EQ-V1OS1 1.26E-09  Constrained non-informative 
    PV OUTLET MOV 1 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.1g)  95th = 5.48E-9 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
H2S-MOV-EQ-V1OS2 1.04E-05  Constrained non-informative 
    PV OUTLET MOV 1 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.3g)  95th = 4.52E-5 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
H2S-MOV-EQ-V1OS3 1.65E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    PV OUTLET MOV 1 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.6g)  95th = 7.17E-3 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
H2S-MOV-EQ-V2IS1 1.26E-09  Constrained non-informative 
    PV INLET MOV 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.1g)  95th = 5.48E-9 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
H2S-MOV-EQ-V2IS2 1.04E-05  Constrained non-informative 
    PV INLET MOV 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.3g)  95th = 4.52E-5 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
H2S-MOV-EQ-V2IS3 1.65E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    PV INLET MOV 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.6g)  95th = 7.17E-3 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
H2S-MOV-EQ-V2OS1 1.26E-09  Constrained non-informative 
    PV OUTLET MOV 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.1g)  95th = 5.48E-9 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
H2S-MOV-EQ-V2OS2 1.04E-05  Constrained non-informative 
    PV OUTLET MOV 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.3g)  95th = 4.52E-5 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
H2S-MOV-EQ-V2OS3 1.65E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    PV OUTLET MOV 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.6g)  95th = 7.17E-3 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
H2S-MOV-RP-1I 1.00E-07  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    PRESSURE VESSEL INLET MOV 1 FAILS  95th = 3.75E-7 
Note:
H2S-MOV-RP-1O 1.00E-07  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    PRESSURE VESSEL OUTLET MOV 1 FAILS  95th = 3.75E-7 
Note:
H2S-MOV-RP-2I 1.00E-07  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    PRESSURE VESSEL INLET MOV 2 FAILS  95th = 3.75E-7 
Note:
H2S-MOV-RP-2O 1.00E-07  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    PRESSURE VESSEL OUTLET MOV 2 FAILS  95th = 3.75E-7 
Note:
H2S-MOV-RP-A1O 1.00E-07  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    ACCUMULATOR 1 OUTLET MOV 1 FAILS  95th = 3.75E-7 
Note:
H2S-MOV-RP-A2O 1.00E-07  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    ACCUMULATOR 2 OUTLET MOV 1 FAILS  95th = 3.75E-7 
Note:
H2S-PIP-EQ-H2S 1.26E-09  Constrained non-informative 
    HYDROGEN SYS PIPING SIESMIC FRAGILITY (0.1g)  95th = 5.48E-9 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-PIP-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
H2S-PIP-EQ-H2S2 1.04E-05  Constrained non-informative 
    HYDROGEN SYS PIPING SIESMIC FRAGILITY (0.3g)  95th = 4.52E-5 
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Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-PIP-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
H2S-PIP-EQ-H2S3 1.65E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    HYDROGEN SYS PIPING SIESMIC FRAGILITY (0.6g)  95th = 7.17E-3 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-PIP-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
H2S-PIP-RP-HYDRO 3.00E-08  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    HYDROGEN SYSTEM PIPING RUPTURE  95th = 1.13E-7 
Note:
H2S-TNK-EQ-1S1 6.06E-11  Constrained non-informative 
    PRESS TANK 1 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.1g)  95th = 2.64E-10 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-VES-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
H2S-TNK-EQ-1S2 6.59E-06  Constrained non-informative 
    PRESS TANK 1 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.3g)  95th = 2.87E-5 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-VES-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
H2S-TNK-EQ-1S3 2.98E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    PRESS TANK 1 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.6g)  95th = 1.29E-2 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-VES-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
H2S-TNK-EQ-2S1 6.06E-11  Constrained non-informative 
    PRESS TANK 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.1g)  95th = 2.64E-10 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-VES-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
H2S-TNK-EQ-2S2 6.59E-06  Constrained non-informative 
    PRESS TANK 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.3g)  95th = 2.87E-5 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-VES-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
H2S-TNK-EQ-2S3 2.98E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    PRESS TANK 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.6g)  95th = 1.29E-2 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-VES-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
H2S-TNK-RP-1 1.00E-07  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    PRESSURE VESSEL 1 FAILS  95th = 3.75E-7 
Note:
H2S-TNK-RP-2 1.00E-07  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    PRESSURE VESSEL 2 FAILS  95th = 3.75E-7 
Note:
HUMAN_ERROR 1.08E-02  Gamma(5.5, .002) 
    Frequency of Hydrogen Events from Human Error  95th = 1.93E-2 
Note:
SFA-BUR-EQ-SHS1 6.06E-11  Constrained non-informative 
    GAS BURNER SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.1)  95th = 2.64E-10 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-VES-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
SFA-BUR-EQ-SHS2 6.59E-06  Constrained non-informative 
    GAS BURNER SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.3)  95th = 2.87E-5 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-VES-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
SFA-BUR-EQ-SHS3 2.98E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    GAS BURNER SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.6)  95th = 1.29E-2 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-VES-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
SFA-BUR-RP-SHEL 1.00E-07  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    GAS SYSTEM BURNER SHELL FAILS  95th = 3.75E-7 
Note:
SFA-CWS-EQ-TWS1 0.00E+00  No distribution 
    COOLING TOWER SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.1)  assigned to this event. 
Note:
SFA-CWS-EQ-TWS2 0.00E+00  No distribution 
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    COOLING TOWER SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.3)  assigned to this event. 
Note:
SFA-CWS-EQ-TWS3 0.00E+00  No distribution 
    COOLING TOWER SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.6)  assigned to this event. 
Note:
SFA-CWS-FC-TWR 0.00E+00  Lognormal(EF=30.0) 
    COOLING TOWER FAILS  95th = 0.00E+0 
Note:
SFA-FAN-EQ-F1S1 6.06E-11  Constrained non-informative 
    AIR BLOWER 1 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.1)  95th = 2.64E-10 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-FAN-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
SFA-FAN-EQ-F1S2 6.59E-06  Constrained non-informative 
    AIR BLOWER 1 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.3)  95th = 2.87E-5 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-FAN-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
SFA-FAN-EQ-F1S3 2.98E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    AIR BLOWER 1 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.6)  95th = 1.29E-2 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-FAN-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
SFA-FAN-EQ-F2S1 6.06E-11  Constrained non-informative 
    AIR BLOWER 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.1)  95th = 2.64E-10 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-FAN-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
SFA-FAN-EQ-F2S2 6.59E-06  Constrained non-informative 
    AIR BLOWER 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.3)  95th = 2.87E-5 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-FAN-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
SFA-FAN-EQ-F2S3 2.98E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    AIR BLOWER 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.6)  95th = 1.29E-2 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-FAN-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
SFA-FAN-FC-1 3.00E-07  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    AIR BLOWER FAN 1 FAILS  95th = 1.13E-6 
Note:
SFA-FAN-FC-2 3.00E-07  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    AIR BLOWER FAN 2 FAILS  95th = 1.13E-6 
Note:
SFA-HTX-EQ-AC1S1 8.44E-11  Constrained non-informative 
    ACID HTX 1 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.1)  95th = 3.67E-10 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-HTX-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
SFA-HTX-EQ-AC1S2 1.81E-05  Constrained non-informative 
    ACID HTX 1 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.3)  95th = 7.87E-5 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-HTX-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
SFA-HTX-EQ-AC1S3 8.47E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    ACID HTX 1 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.6)  95th = 3.67E-2 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-HTX-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
SFA-HTX-EQ-AC21S1 8.44E-11  Constrained non-informative 
    ACID HTX 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.1)  95th = 3.67E-10 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-HTX-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
SFA-HTX-EQ-AC21S2 1.81E-05  Constrained non-informative 
    ACID HTX 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.3)  95th = 7.87E-5 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-HTX-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
SFA-HTX-EQ-AC21S3 8.47E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    ACID HTX 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.6)  95th = 3.67E-2 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-HTX-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
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SFA-HTX-FC-1 1.00E-07  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    ACID COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER 1 FAILS  95th = 3.75E-7 
Note:
SFA-HTX-FC-2 1.00E-07  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    ACID COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER 2 FAILS  95th = 3.75E-7 
Note:
SFA-MDP-EQ-AP1S1 4.05E-11  Constrained non-informative 
    ACID PUMP 1 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.1)  95th = 1.76E-10 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MDP-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
SFA-MDP-EQ-AP1S2 1.11E-05  Constrained non-informative 
    ACID PUMP 1 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.3)  95th = 4.83E-5 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MDP-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
SFA-MDP-EQ-AP1S3 6.23E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    ACID PUMP 1 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.6)  95th = 2.70E-2 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MDP-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
SFA-MDP-EQ-AP2S1 4.05E-11  Constrained non-informative 
    ACID PUMP 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.1)  95th = 1.76E-10 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MDP-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
SFA-MDP-EQ-AP2S2 1.11E-05  Constrained non-informative 
    ACID PUMP 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.3)  95th = 4.83E-5 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MDP-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
SFA-MDP-EQ-AP2S3 6.23E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    ACID PUMP 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.6)  95th = 2.70E-2 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MDP-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
SFA-MDP-RP-1 1.00E-06  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    SULFURIC ACID PUMP 1 FAILS  95th = 3.75E-6 
Note:
SFA-MDP-RP-2 1.00E-06  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    SULFURIC ACID PUMP 2 FAILS  95th = 3.75E-6 
Note:
SFA-MOV-EQ-AP1S1 1.26E-09  Constrained non-informative 
    PUMP 1 MOV SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.1)  95th = 5.48E-9 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
SFA-MOV-EQ-AP1S2 1.04E-05  Constrained non-informative 
    PUMP 1 MOV SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.3)  95th = 4.52E-5 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
SFA-MOV-EQ-AP1S3 1.65E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    PUMP 1 MOV SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.6)  95th = 7.17E-3 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
SFA-MOV-EQ-AP2S1 1.26E-09  Constrained non-informative 
    PUMP 2 MOV SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.1)  95th = 5.48E-9 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
SFA-MOV-EQ-AP2S2 1.04E-05  Constrained non-informative 
    PUMP 2 MOV SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.31)  95th = 4.52E-5 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
SFA-MOV-EQ-AP2S3 1.65E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    PUMP 2 MOV SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.6)  95th = 7.17E-3 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
SFA-MOV-RP-P1 5.00E-07  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    SULFURIC ACID PUMP 1 MOV FAILS  95th = 1.88E-6 
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Note:
SFA-MOV-RP-P2 5.00E-07  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    SULFURIC ACID PUMP 2 MOV FAILS  95th = 1.88E-6 
Note:
SFA-PIP-EQ-SAS1 1.26E-09  Constrained non-informative 
    SULFURIC ACID PIPING SIESMIC FRAGILITY (0.1)  95th = 5.48E-9 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-PIP-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
SFA-PIP-EQ-SAS2 1.04E-05  Constrained non-informative 
    SULFURIC ACID PIPING SIESMIC FRAGILITY (0.3)  95th = 4.52E-5 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-PIP-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
SFA-PIP-EQ-SAS3 1.65E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    SULFURIC ACID PIPING SIESMIC FRAGILITY (0.6)  95th = 7.17E-3 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-PIP-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
SFA-PIP-RP-ACID 7.20E-07  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    SULFURIC ACID DAMAGES PIPING  95th = 2.70E-6 
Note:
SFA-TNK-EQ-STS1 9.87E-08  Constrained non-informative 
    ACID TANK SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.1)  95th = 4.29E-7 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-TNK-EQ-SEIS1 template event. 
SFA-TNK-EQ-STS2 1.61E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    ACID TANK SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.3)  95th = 7.00E-3 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-TNK-EQ-SEIS2 template event. 
SFA-TNK-EQ-STS3 1.15E-01  Constrained non-informative 
    ACID TANK SEISMIC FRAGILITY (0.6)  95th = 4.70E-1 
Note: This event uses the TEMPEV-TNK-EQ-SEIS3 template event. 
SFA-TNK-FC-TNK 1.00E-07  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    SULFURIC ACID STORAGE TANK RUPTURE  95th = 3.75E-7 
Note:
SFA-TNK-RP-TNK 1.00E-07  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    SULFURIC ACID STORAGE TANK OVERFILL  95th = 3.75E-7 
Note:
SFA-XHE-XA-BUR 1.00E-03  Lognormal(EF=10.0) 
    OPERATOR ACTION CAUSES BURNER EXPLOSION  95th = 3.75E-3 
Note:
TEMPEV-ACC-EQ-SEIS1 1.45E-12  Constrained non-informative 
    TEMPLATE EVENT SEISMIC FRAGILITY FOR 
ACCUMULATOR (0.1g) 
 95th = 6.30E-12 
Note:
TEMPEV-ACC-EQ-SEIS2 1.11E-06  Constrained non-informative 
    TEMPLATE EVENT SEISMIC FRAGILITY FOR 
ACCUMULATOR (0.3g) 
 95th = 4.84E-6 
Note:
TEMPEV-ACC-EQ-SEIS3 1.43E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    TEMPLATE EVENT SEISMIC FRAGILITY FOR 
ACCUMULATOR (0.6g) 
 95th = 6.22E-3 
Note:
TEMPEV-FAN-EQ-SEIS1 6.06E-11  Constrained non-informative 
    TEMPLATE EVENT SEISMIC FRAGILITY FOR AIR 
HANDLING UNIT  (0.1g) 
 95th = 2.64E-10 
Note:
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TEMPEV-FAN-EQ-SEIS2 6.59E-06  Constrained non-informative 
    TEMPLATE EVENT SEISMIC FRAGILITY FOR AIR 
HANDLING UNIT  (0.3g) 
 95th = 2.87E-5 
Note:
TEMPEV-FAN-EQ-SEIS3 2.98E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    TEMPLATE EVENT SEISMIC FRAGILITY FOR AIR 
HANDLING UNIT  (0.6g) 
 95th = 1.29E-2 
Note:
TEMPEV-HTX-EQ-SEIS1 8.44E-11  Constrained non-informative 
    TEMPLATE EVENT SEISMIC FRAGILITY FOR HTX (0.1g)  95th = 3.67E-10 
Note:
TEMPEV-HTX-EQ-SEIS2 1.81E-05  Constrained non-informative 
    TEMPLATE EVENT SEISMIC FRAGILITY FOR HTX (0.3g)  95th = 7.87E-5 
Note:
TEMPEV-HTX-EQ-SEIS3 8.47E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    TEMPLATE EVENT SEISMIC FRAGILITY FOR HTX (0.6g)  95th = 3.67E-2 
Note:
TEMPEV-MDP-EQ-SEIS1 4.05E-11  Constrained non-informative 
    TEMPLATE EVENT SEISMIC FRAGILITY FOR MOTOR 
DRIVEN PUMP  (0.1g) 
 95th = 1.76E-10 
Note:
TEMPEV-MDP-EQ-SEIS2 1.11E-05  Constrained non-informative 
    TEMPLATE EVENT SEISMIC FRAGILITY FOR MOTOR 
DRIVEN PUMP  (0.3g) 
 95th = 4.83E-5 
Note:
TEMPEV-MDP-EQ-SEIS3 6.23E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    TEMPLATE EVENT SEISMIC FRAGILITY FOR MOTOR 
DRIVEN PUMP  (0.6g) 
 95th = 2.70E-2 
Note:
TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS1 1.26E-09  Constrained non-informative 
    TEMPLATE EVENT SEISMIC FRAGILITY FOR MOV  (0.1g)  95th = 5.48E-9 
Note:
TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS2 1.04E-05  Constrained non-informative 
    TEMPLATE EVENT SEISMIC FRAGILITY FOR MOV  (0.3g)  95th = 4.52E-5 
Note:
TEMPEV-MOV-EQ-SEIS3 1.65E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    TEMPLATE EVENT SEISMIC FRAGILITY FOR MOV  (0.6g)  95th = 7.17E-3 
Note:
TEMPEV-PIP-EQ-SEIS1 1.26E-09  Constrained non-informative 
    TEMPLATE EVENT SEISMIC FRAGILITY FOR PIPING 
(0.1g)
 95th = 5.48E-9 
Note:
TEMPEV-PIP-EQ-SEIS2 1.04E-05  Constrained non-informative 
    TEMPLATE EVENT SEISMIC FRAGILITY FOR PIPING 
(0.3g)
 95th = 4.52E-5 
Note:
TEMPEV-PIP-EQ-SEIS3 1.65E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    TEMPLATE EVENT SEISMIC FRAGILITY FOR PIPING 
(0.6g)
 95th = 7.17E-3 
Note:
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TEMPEV-TNK-EQ-SEIS1 9.87E-08  Constrained non-informative 
    TEMPLATE EVENT SEISMIC FRAGILITY FOR STORAGE 
TANK  (0.1g) 
 95th = 4.29E-7 
Note:
TEMPEV-TNK-EQ-SEIS2 1.61E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    TEMPLATE EVENT SEISMIC FRAGILITY FOR STORAGE 
TANK  (0.3g) 
 95th = 7.00E-3 
Note:
TEMPEV-TNK-EQ-SEIS3 1.15E-01  Constrained non-informative 
    TEMPLATE EVENT SEISMIC FRAGILITY FOR STORAGE 
TANK  (0.6g) 
 95th = 4.70E-1 
Note:
TEMPEV-VES-EQ-SEIS1 6.06E-11  Constrained non-informative 
    TEMPLATE EVENT SEISMIC FRAGILITY FOR 
PRESSURIZED VESSEL (0.1g) 
 95th = 2.64E-10 
Note:
TEMPEV-VES-EQ-SEIS2 6.59E-06  Constrained non-informative 
    TEMPLATE EVENT SEISMIC FRAGILITY FOR 
PRESSURIZED VESSEL (0.3g) 
 95th = 2.87E-5 
Note:
TEMPEV-VES-EQ-SEIS3 2.98E-03  Constrained non-informative 
    TEMPLATE EVENT SEISMIC FRAGILITY FOR 
PRESSURIZED VESSEL (0.6g) 
 95th = 1.29E-2 
Note:
